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ABSTRACT 
The favorable demographics that have contributed to China’s rapid economic 
growth are changing. China’s working-age population is currently peaking and within 
two decades its overall population will begin to shrink. In addition to a shrinking 
working-age population, China will see an increase in the elderly population and a rising 
dependency ratio. This demographic change may have an economically significant 
impact. If China’s enormous stock of labor and low dependency ratio were key elements 
in its rapid economic growth, then some economists conclude that the reversal of these 
elements will have detrimental effects on the Chinese economy.  
This thesis examines this argument by examining how Germany, Japan, and 
Russia have already faced and attempted to mitigate similar demographic changes, and 
assesses China’s potential mitigation strategies in this light. For each country, the thesis 
examines two economically significant demographic changes—decreasing working-age 
population and rising dependency ratio—and then examines how strategies to maximize 
labor force participation, increase productivity, and control old age benefits can 
potentially mitigate their effects. The comparison of China with Germany, Japan, and 
Russia leads to the conclusion that China is poorly prepared to mitigate the economic 
effects of its coming demographic change. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As the Chinese economy continues to grow in prominence in the world, it faces 
the possible challenge of a demographic drag on growth. In the past three decades, China 
has reaped a demographic dividend of working-age adults. This dividend has enabled 
China to achieve impressive growth, but this demographic dividend will soon recede, 
revealing potentially significant problems. Through the lens of population transition 
theory, this thesis analyzes the factors that contributed to China’s demographic trajectory 
and looming challenges. A variety of factors have combined to shape China’s 
demographics, including: government policy, cultural gender preferences, improved 
health services, and changing family ideals.   
The thesis then examines how Germany, Japan, and Russia have already faced 
and attempted to mitigate similar demographic changes; and assesses China’s potential 
mitigation strategies in this light. The comparator cases highlight the impact of 
demographics on labor markets and individual economic behavior, leading to broader 
economic challenges. For each country, the thesis examines two economically significant 
demographic changes—decreasing working-age population and rising dependency 
ratio—and then examines how strategies to maximize labor force participation, increase 
productivity, and control old age benefits can potentially mitigate their effects. Overall, 
the thesis finds that China’s labor force is likely to shrink not only because of 
demographic factors, but also due to losing potential workers through immigration and by 
decreasing labor force participation by females. Additionally, China does not appear 
likely to mitigate its shrinking workforce by dramatic productivity gains. China’s 
mitigation potential is better when considering elderly employment and controlling the 
cost to the government of old-age benefits. Overall, this thesis concludes that China is 
currently poorly suited to mitigate the economic impacts of demographic change 
A. RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE 
China’s population is aging at an earlier stage of economic development than any 
other major developed country. In 2004, Richard Jackson and Neil Howe stated, “China 
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may be the first major country to grow old before it grows rich.”1 In 2007, Barry 
Naughton more confidently provides a similar prognosis: “China will grow old before it 
has had the opportunity to grow rich.”2 These views are supported by the fact that the 
World Bank’s demographic statistics point to 2015 as the year during which China’s total 
working age population (15–64) will reach its zenith.3 The projection of an absolute 
decline in the working-age population demonstrates how severely China may be affected 
by aging. Many developed nations have experienced a decline in working-age population 
as a proportion of overall population due to demographic trends, and this is also true for 
China. In the context of a growing population, this proportional change indicates that the 
working-age population is growing more slowly than other age cohorts of the population. 
In contrast, China will soon have a shrinking population; thus, not only will the working-
age cohort shrink in relative terms, but in absolute terms as well. China’s demographic 
makeup and immigration policies are combining to create a situation in which fewer 
workers will be available to drive the world’s second largest economy. While China’s 
economy looms large when measured in the aggregate (2014 GDP $10.36 trillion, 
world’s second largest economy behind the United States),4 per capita statistics reflect 
that China (2014 GDP per capita $7,593.9 [current U.S.$]) is only just reaching global 
middle-income status.5  
Human capital is an essential ingredient of economic growth. On an individual 
level, human capital is described as “the sum total of skills embodied within an 
                                                 
1 Richard Jackson and Neil Howe, The Graying of the Middle Kingdom: The Demographics and 
Economics of Retirement Policy in China (Washington, D.C: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
2004), 3, http://www.lifestarinstitute.org/_archive/files/library/CSIS-GAI-China-
The_Graying_of_the_Middle_Kingdom.pdf.  
2 Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
2007), 176. 
3 The World Bank, “Population Estimates and Projections,” August 16, 2015, 
http://datatopics.worldbank.org/hnp/popestimates# 
4 The World Bank, “GDP (current US$),” August 16, 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD 
5 The World Bank, “GDP per capita (current US$),” August 16, 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD 
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individual.”6 In turn, the aggregate of each individual’s human capital could be thought 
of as total national-level human capital. This means much more than the sheer number of 
workers, as it would also factor in education, talents, and other abilities that a worker 
possesses. This is demonstrated by the difference in production between a group of 
unskilled workers and those who possess applicable skills: even if the overall number of 
workers in both groups is equal, the skilled group will out-produce the unskilled group, 
based on a difference of human capital. If the working-age population of a country is 
shrinking without a corresponding increase in other aspects of human capital (e.g., 
education, health, etc.), then it follows that the human capital of the country is shrinking. 
If an increase of human capital contributed to economic growth, then a relative tapering 
off can be expected to have a corresponding detrimental effect on growth, all else being 
equal.  
Changes in economic growth due to demographics may, in turn, contribute to 
social and political changes. Chinese demographer and scholar Wang Feng asserts 
demographic forces “have already begun to exert a powerful impact on the Chinese 
economy, and pose a serious risk to future economic growth, social harmony and political 
stability.”7 Changes in the pace of economic growth and the country’s demographic 
makeup, have the potential to create instability; this effect is magnified by China being 
the world’s most populous country.  
Understanding the underlying aspects of the economic and demographic changes 
in China will provide insight for potential dangers to the world economy from slowing 
Chinese economic growth. At just under 1 trillion dollars in growth, the Chinese 
economy accounted for about half of world-wide economic growth in 2014.8 Economic 
and business news media are quick to point to a threat to global economic health from 
Chinese GDP growth slowing even slightly below the Chinese government’s target of 
                                                 
6 Charles Wheelan, Naked Economics: Undressing the Dismal Science (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2010), 127. 
7 Wang Feng, “Demographic Transition: Racing towards the Precipice,” China Economic Quarterly 
(2012): 17, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/06/china-demographics-wang.  
8 World Bank, “GDP,” http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/countries/1W-
CN?display=graph. 
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7.5%.9 When China’s economic growth slows, repercussions are felt throughout the 
world. If demographic trends are contributing to lowering economic growth, Chinese 
growth may slow. Since Chinese growth has driven much of global economic growth for 
the past decade, the global economy may face slower growth rates. 
Both domestically and globally, China’s demographics have had and will 
continue to have an impact. This thesis endeavors to contribute to the understanding of 
this impact. Some prescribe to the sentiment represented by French sociologist Auguste 
Comte when he said, “Demography is destiny.” This viewpoint portrays demographics as 
a singularly important aspect of economic growth, with an impact that can be neither 
shaped nor mitigated, but instead only must be endured. This thesis acknowledges that 
demographics have shaped and will continue to affect China’s economic destiny, but 
challenges the view that demographics are deterministic as overly simplistic.   
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Examination of scholarly literature on three themes of the economic-demographic 
situation in China forms the academic foundation for this thesis. The first theme reviewed 
is how China’s current demographic situation came to be. These works examine how 
changes in fertility, mortality, and aging have shaped China’s demographics. This chapter 
also explores how government policy and modernization have contributed to these 
changes. This section provides the background for understanding the demographic 
transition of modern China. The second theme discussed in the review is the demographic 
dividend and how it has impacted China’s economy. This examines authors who have 
demonstrated how the high growth China has experience in the past three decades is 
partially attributable to demographic factors. Also examined are several causal linkages 
that have been suggested between demographics and growth. This is important to 
understanding what effect changes in the underlying demographics may have on the 
economy. The third part of the literature review examines projections that scholars have 
                                                 
9 For example, Jake Spring and Xiaoyi Shao, “China’s Growth Slowest since Global Crisis, Annual 
Target at Risk,” Reuters, October 21, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/. and Martin Patience, “China’s 
Economic Growth Slows to More than Five-Year Low,” BBC, October 21, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/. 
and Michael Schuman, “Anyone Expecting a Rebound in Chinese Growth Won’t Like the New GDP 
Figures,” Time, October 21, 2014, http//www.time.com/. 
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made concerning the future of China’s economic growth. This exposes a variety a 
viewpoints on how scholars expect demographic pressures to affect China’s growth.   
1. China’s Demographic Transition 
Demographic trends initially appear simple to understand and quantify. 
Populations can be counted and the methods of change are limited to the discrete events 
of birth, death, and immigration. Modern states can provide accurate estimates at the rate 
these events occur and simple math can be used to estimate future population figures. 
This deceptive simplicity masks the facts that a myriad of factors contributes to 
demographic change. In Dudley Kirk’s review of demographic transition theory he states, 
“Demography is a science short on theory, but rich in quantification.”10 To understand 
China’s demographic transition, this review examines the factors that have impacted 
fertility, and how they have led to rapid aging.  
a. Fertility 
China’s fertility has dramatically dropped from 6.1 children per women in 1950–
1955 to the current level of about 1.6 children per women.11 This trend has not been 
limited to China alone; worldwide, “the trend towards smaller families is one of the most 
enduring social developments of modern times.”12 Wang Feng notes that China’s fertility 
level is comparable to present-day Germany, Japan, and Russia.13 The worldwide trend 
only represents part of the dynamic occurring in China, since “the decline in Chinese 
birthrates is in part the inevitable result of modernization, in part the result of deliberate 
government population control policy.”14 In examining the role of government policy in 
fertility, Tuljapurkar explains that “most of the fertility change was concentrated in time, 
in the late 1970s with the ‘Later, Longer, Fewer’ campaign and then around 1990 with 
                                                 
10 Dudley Kirk, “Demographic Transition Theory,” Population Studies (1996), 361. 
11 UNData, “Total Fertility Rate,” World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, August 25, 2015, 
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=fertility&d=PopDiv&f=variableID%3a54; 
12 Richard Jackson and Neil Howe, The Graying of the Great Powers: Demography and Geopolitics in 
the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2008), 47.  
13 Wang, “Racing Towards the Precipice,” 17. 
14 Jackson and Howe, Graying of the Middle Kingdom, 8. 
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the one-child policy.”15 The argument is that, since drops in fertility are occurring in 
concentrated periods, which correspond with the government’s population control policy 
and when its effects are felt, a significant amount of the reduction in fertility is due to 
policy. In addition to changes occurring during concentrated time periods, changes in 
fertility have also been disproportionately concentrated in urban areas.16 England agrees 
with Tuljapurkar that, while the overwhelming trend has been a decline in fertility, this 
trend occurs non-uniformly over time and location.17  
As one of the most well-known examples of government policy affecting fertility, 
the one-child policy is the subject of much scholarly work. General views on the 
effectiveness of the policy to control population growth vary. The goal of the policy was 
to “ensure that rapid population growth would not impede social and economic 
development.”18 By limiting population growth, the government believed it could better 
guide economic development and prevent high levels of unemployment, inadequate 
opportunities for education and exhaustion of resources.19 Wang and Mason describe the 
state’s concern as employing a “neo-Malthusian perspective” that the population would 
exceed the ability of resources to provide high standard of living and “framing of 
population growth as the root of all evils.”20 Chinese officials are cited claiming that the 
policy has prevented 330 million births.21 Others have argued that the policy did little to 
reduce the actual birth rate beyond the expected decrease due to modernization but also 
forced couples to hide additional children. This view is supported by Naughton in his 
                                                 
15 Shripad Tuljapurkar, “How Demography Shapes Individual, Social, and Economic Transitions in 
Asia” in Aging Asia: The Economic and Social Implications of Rapid Demographic Change in China, 
Japan, and South Korea, ed. Karen Eggleston and Shripad Tuljapurkar (Stanford, CA: Walter H. 
Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Books, 2010), 35–36. 
16 Ibid., 36. 
17 Robert Stowe England, Aging China: The Demographic Challenge to China’s Economic Prospects , 
The Washington Papers (Westport, Ct: Praeger, 2005), 19. 
18 David Truesdell, “China’s Demographic Limits To Economic Growth” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2012), 42.  
19 Ibid., 43. 
20 Wang Feng and Andrew Mason, “The Demographic Factor in China’s Transition” in China’s Great 
Economic Transformation, ed. Loren Brandt and Thomas G. Rawski (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 136. 
21 England, Aging China, 21. 
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review of the policy, “despite the strictness of the One-Child Policy, it has never been 
fully successful,” and during the 1980s about half of the children born were second child 
or later in birth order.22 Evidence of underreporting of births is found in censuses that 
count larger populations of children than were reported born in the corresponding birth 
year.23  
Another impact of policy’s impact on changes in fertility is on how the population 
of working age individuals will change over time. The growth rate or very soon the 
decline rate for this population will fluctuate due to baby busts that accompanied changes 
in government policy.24 The economic impact of waves of workers aging out of the work 
force within a few years may prove potentially more troubling than if a similar transition 
had occurred steadily over a larger timeframe. 
An additional unintended effect of the one-child policy has been an increase 
imbalance in the gender ratio.25 Hudson and den Boer examine the historical reasons that 
Chinese society has preferred male off-spring and policies that have contributed to the 
unnaturally high ratio of males to females.26 This phenomenon is present to varying 
degrees throughout Asia but is particularly pronounced in China.27 The consequences of 
a high-sex ratio society are potentially detrimental in a variety of aspects. Socially, for 
example, these societies are prone to higher levels of individual and collective violence, 
crime in general and drug use.28 Economically, unmarried males are less likely to be 
employed and women in high-sex ratio societies are less likely to be part of the work 
force.29 
                                                 
22 Naughton, The Chinese Economy, 170. 
23 England, Aging China, 21. 
24 Tuljapurkar, “How Demography Shapes,” 36. 
25 Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea M. den Boer, Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia’s 
Surplus Male Population (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004), 154. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., 132, 138–152. 
28 Ibid., 14–198, 201. 
29 Ibid., 189, 203. 
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b. Mortality and Aging 
As societies modernize, they have almost universally experienced a demographic 
transition brought on by increasing longevity and decreasing fertility. China, like other 
societies, is experiencing this familiar trend but, as Wang Feng notes, the transition is 
occurring in China “far more quickly than most other counties, largely thanks to the 
speed of its demographic transition from high death and birth rates to low death and birth 
rates.”30 England observes that life expectancy increased from 44.8 years to 71.78 years 
for women and 42.3 years to 68.13 years for men since the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949 to 1995.31 The result of this increased life expectancy and 
reduced fertility is to skew the population older—England notes that the percentage of 
people 65 and older will more than triple from the 7% in 2000 to somewhere in the low 
20% range by 2040.32  
The data shows that aging is occurring and will continue, but what is not agreed 
upon are the ultimate effects of the trend. Wang points out lower private savings rates and 
a shrinking supply of cheap labor as two potential challenges associated with this trend, 
but also areas of opportunity, including increased demand for financial services and 
vehicles for retirement investments and a growing health care industry.33 England notes 
that longevity and an underdeveloped pension system will lead to pressure for the state to 
provide more social welfare benefits stressing public finances but downplays any 
possible labor shortages due to aging because of the large underutilized rural labor 
force.34 Beyond economic concerns, aging will bring numerous health concerns like 
dementia and diabetes, which may stretch the state’s healthcare systems.35 Aging will 
                                                 
30 Wang, “Racing Towards the Precipice,” 18. 
31 England, Aging China, 14. 
32 Ibid., 17. 
33 Wang, “Racing Towards the Precipice,” 19–20. 
34 England, Aging China, 118–119. 
35 Karen Eggleston and Shripad Tuljapurkar, “Introduction” in Aging Asia: The Economic and Social 
Implications of Rapid Demographic Change in China, Japan, and South Korea, ed. Karen Eggleston and 
Shripad Tuljapurkar (Stanford, CA: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Books, 2010), 3. 
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also bring social change, disrupting traditional family structures impacting both young 
and old.36   
2. Demographic Dividend in China’s Economic Transformation 
Essential to determining the potential impact of demographic changes on the 
Chinese economy is understanding how they have affected the economy in the recent 
past. Views on the impact of demographic changes on the economic transformation vary 
widely. The authors of China: The Balance Sheet do not include demographics as one of 
the key five key factors that have led to growth, instead focusing on policy changes that 
have unleashed the Chinese economy.37 Barry Naughton credits declining dependency 
rates as the explanation for “a portion of the rapid growth in per capita GDP over the past 
two decades.”38 Bloom and Williamson statistically attempt to place a number on this 
portion of growth for the entirety of East Asia. They determine that “a one percent 
increase in the growth rate of the working age population is associated with a 1.46 
percent increase in the growth rate of GDP per capita.”39 By Bloom and Williamson’s 
estimates, favorable demographic changes account for as much as a third of economic 
growth during East Asia’s miracle.40 This is similar to findings by Wang Feng and 
Andrew Mason, who state demographics “accounted for 15 percent of China’s economic 
growth between 1982 and 2000.”41 While the exact percentage of growth due to 
demographic transition is arguable, the demographic dividend has contributed significant 
economic growth to the Chinese. 
Several causal links are used to explain how the demographic dividend spurs 
economic growth. One view is that it is the changes in age distribution brought by the 
                                                 
36 Eggleston and Tuljapurkar, “Introduction,” 12–13. 
37 C. Fred Bergsten, Bates Gill, Nicholas R. Lardy, and Derek J. Mitchell, China: The Balance Sheet 
(New York, Public Affairs: 2006), 19. 
38 Naughton, The Chinese Economy, 174. 
39 David E. Bloom and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Demographic Transitions and Economic Miracles in 
Emerging Asia” (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 6268, 1997), 14. 
40 Ibid., 4. 
41 Wang and Mason, “The Demographic Factor,” 147. 
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demographic dividend that contributes to economic growth.42 This is due to individuals 
being able to save and invest excess resources accumulated during their working years.43 
This increased investment spurs growth and economic development. A second, less 
established link is that younger populations are more malleable, learning skills needed to 
drive a growing and changing economy.44   
3. Predictions on the Future Demographic Effects 
As authors have questioned how China’s evolving demographics will affect its 
future, the responses have ranged from alarming to moderate. This review examines first 
those who believe the effect of demographics on the economy will be catastrophic, 
leading to a dramatic slowdown in growth, stagnation, or even contraction. Secondly, this 
section will examine views that foresee an alternative future, in which China may 
continue its growth, albeit likely at a reduced rate. 
Susan Shirk describes China as “racing the demographic clock.”45 Shirk’s 
concern is that without government policy changes, demographic burdens will 
overwhelm the pension and health-care systems.46 Shirk believes that the aging strain 
will be more pronounced on China than it has been on similar countries like Japan and 
Korea.47 Jackson and Howe describe a retirement crisis. The crisis has formed as most 
Chinese have relied on families for support as they age.48 This system will crumble due 
to the “4-2-1 problem” of four grandparents and two parents all relying on one worker for 
support.49 Even more dramatically, Jackson and Howe extend their argument beyond 
economics, stating China is one of several nations experiencing “extreme demographic 
change that could push them either toward civil collapse or (in reaction) neo-
                                                 
42 Bloom and Williamson, “Demographic Transitions and Economic Miracles,” 3. 
43 Naughton, The Chinese Economy, 174. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), 20. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Jackson and Howe, Graying of the Middle Kingdom, 3. 
49 Ibid., 3. 
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authoritarianism.”50 Wang Feng also sees stormy skies ahead, stating “as China’s 
demographic fortunes reverse, the economy will slow down regardless of other factors 
driving growth.”51 Wang continues, “after years of demographically powered high-speed 
growth, the Chinese bullet train is racing towards a demographic precipice.”52 These 
authors believe that the window for structural reforms is closed or closing and without 
reform China should expect a difficult future due to demographic pressures. 
Other authors have a more optimistic perspective on China’s future. Some see 
China as having significant untapped resources of human capital. Naughton describes 
how frequently human labor is still being used for menial, back-breaking tasks, that could 
be replaced by machines to increase productivity.53 This acknowledgement of the 
significant amounts of underutilized rural labor available is echoed by Minami et al., who 
agree that “the country is still endowed with a vast rural hinterland with abundant labor 
supply,” but simultaneously there are concerns that restrictions on rural to urban labor 
movement will allow urban labor shortages to remain despite the rural surplus.54 In 
conclusion, most authors agree that demographics will present a challenge to China’s 
continued growth, but that with appropriate policy this challenge may be mitigated. 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Demographics have had a significant positive impact on China’s growth. This 
thesis maintains that this demographic dividend has been essentially exhausted and the 
benefit it has provided will fade as well. This is a similar transition point that the case 
studies of Germany, Japan, and Russia have also faced.  
A simplistic view of the demographic difficulties facing China suggests that the 
Chinese economy will flounder under demographic pressures, based on the following 
                                                 
50 Jackson and Howe, Graying of the Great Powers, 193. 
51 Wang, “Racing Towards the Precipice,” 19. 
52 Ibid., 21. 
53 Naughton, The Chinese Economy, 180. 
54 Jinjun Xue and Wenshu Gao, “Labor Migration and Urban-Rural Income Disparity,” in Lewisian 
Turning Point in the Chinese Economy: Comparison with East Asian Countries, ed. Ryoshin Minami, 
Fumio Makino and Kwan S. Kim (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 210. 
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logic. The demographic transition will lead to a shrinking labor force and with abundant 
labor gone the price of labor will rise. Without relatively low cost labor, the comparative 
advantage which has driven Chinese economic growth, the Chinese economy will slip 
into stagnation or decline. Exacerbating this will be the increased cost of caring for a 
growing elderly population and, in turn, the reduced savings and hence potential for 
domestic investment. This is the scenario that those most pessimistic on the future of the 
Chinese economy foresee.  
Thus, a “demographics as economic destiny hypothesis,” may conclude that 
economic decline for China is unavoidable. This logic assesses, as do Jackson and Howe, 
that due to demographic change, “workforces will actually shrink from one decade to the 
next – and GDPs may stagnate or even decline.”55 This thesis will attempt to show that 
this hypothesis is overly simplistic. Instead of demographics being key to economic 
destiny this thesis will examine additional case studies for factors that can shape or 
mitigate the economic impact of demographic change. 
A second group of hypotheses may conclude that China’s demographics will have 
a limited effect on economic growth. It might predict that China’s economic growth will 
be lower in the future not due to demographic reasons, but instead because continued 
growth at the current rate is unsustainable. In this line of thinking, the demographic 
dividend and its connection to growth is overblown and other factors account for China’s 
economic growth. As an economy transitions to a developed economy, the role of 
demographics is insignificant compared to those of innovation and productivity increases.  
A third hypothesis is that the effects of demographic change can be mitigated. It 
does not deny demographics as an important factor, but instead of viewing them as an 
inalterable force, the demographic impact on the economy can be affected by a variety of 
factors. Particular factors might include work force maximization through workforce 
participation of females, elderly and immigrant labor. Another potential mitigation factor 
is increasing labor productivity, doing more with fewer workers. The final mitigation 
factor examined is controlling the cost to the government of elderly benefits. This 
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hypothesis maintains that countries can be successful in mitigating the effects of 
demographic challenges and can continue to grow economically.    
“Growing old before growing rich,” is a challenge brought about by policy and 
pressures unique to China, but this challenge also provides opportunity for continued 
growth of the Chinese economy. China still has a significant surplus of labor that is tied 
up in low-productivity, subsistence agriculture.56 The feared scarcities of migrant 
workers in urban industries is not occurring due to demographic constraints, but instead 
policy constraints.57 While demographics will be unfavorable to provide new workers in 
the future these policy constraints have held the economy back from its full potential and 
in easing them additional labor is available for the market. Critical in China will be 
turning a large population of underemployed, low productivity workers, into a slightly 
smaller population which has high workforce participation rates and high levels of 
productively. Scarcity of new workers, driven by demographic factors, may contribute to 
this transition.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design underpinning this thesis is a comparative case study 
approach. China’s demographics are unique; no other nation will be so dramatically 
affected by a combination of policy and low fertility associated with modernization to 
create such a rapid demographic transition. This implies that any case studies examined 
will be an inexact reflection of possibilities that faces China. While this concern is valid, 
it is present always when using historical case studies and the differences are not so 
extreme to invalidate the method as an analytical approach. What the case studies reveal, 
will likely be also present within modern China to an even greater extent. 
Appropriate selection of case studies is a critical aspect of research design. The 
basic criteria used must be quantifiable and avoid reinforcing preconceived expectations. 
While the focus of the thesis will be economic, it is the unique demographic condition 
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that is the independent variable being studied. This is the reason the criteria for selection 
are demographic in nature instead of economic. The criteria used were populations in 
excess of 50 million with negative population growth in 2014.58 The three countries that 
fulfill both of these criteria are Germany, Japan and Russia. These can countries provide 
insight into the challenges that China will face in its near demographic future.  
Germany, Japan and Russia provide examples of several possible economic 
outcomes from the later stages of demographic transitions and also strategies that 
governments have used to temper demographic effects. In the case of Germany, the 
government has adopted pro-natal policies including increased child-care facilities and 
parental leave.59 Germany is also experiencing increased immigration, mitigating the 
effects of declining fertility on demographics. Currently, 13% of the German population 
was foreign-born, a historical high.60 In Japan, one of the first countries to experience 
demographic aging, mitigation has included relatively smaller public pensions to reduce 
the impact of aging on government finances and the highest elderly labor-force 
participation rate in the developed world.61 Finally, Russia has not only experienced 
declining fertility but is also facing falling life expectancies as well.62 This demographic 
trend is undercutting economic growth and investments in human capital.63 In addressing 
the demographic situation, Russia is employing both incentives to induce Russians 
abroad to repatriate and to encourage higher fertility.64 The effect of these policies on 
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demographics remains to be seen. The effect of demographics on the Russian economy 
may also be different because much of the economy depends on the extraction of natural 
resources.   
E. THESIS ARGUMENT AND OVERVIEW 
This thesis finds that the economic effects of demographics are important, but can 
be shaped or mitigated. This conclusion is reached by examining the differing economic 
outcomes of countries facing similar economic challenges. This thesis then continues to 
consider what factors are important to mitigation and to what extent they are present and 
what effect they have had in the economies of Germany, Japan, and Russia. The extent of 
these mitigation factors is then used to provide a baseline for evaluation of China. This 
evaluation finds that China is poorly prepared for its coming demographic change.    
This thesis examines this argument through five chapters.  
The second chapter focuses on understanding China’s demographic trajectory. 
This is accomplished by examining population transition theory in general and assessing 
how China’s recent demographic history fits this model. This history is broken down into 
two time periods: the Mao Zedong-influenced era from the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China until the death of Mao; and the Post-Mao era, from Mao’s death to the 
present. This review pays specific attention to the role that government policy has had in 
shaping China’s demography. Finally, this chapter includes several of the potential 
economic impacts of China’s demographic trajectory. 
The third chapter establishes the comparison case studies used to determine how 
well China is poised to mitigate the economic effects of demographic change. This begins 
by briefly reviewing the demographic and economic situation of the comparison 
countries: Germany, Japan, and Russia. Next, three specific economic aspects that may 
provide mitigation are reviewed; in maximization of potential labor, productive use of 
labor, and controlling the cost of elderly care.  
The fourth chapter compares China with the comparison case studies, seeking to 
understand to what extent is it likely that China will be able to emulate and benefit from 
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similar mitigation strategies. This chapter begins with a historical look at China’s 
economy in two periods: the economy under Mao Zedong, and the growth and reform 
that has occurred since his death. Then China is assessed against the comparison case 
studies to understand if China will be likely to benefit from similar mitigation strategies.  
The fifth chapter is the conclusion. This chapter reviews the findings of the three 
previous chapters—that China is destined for demographic change, that the economic 
effects of demographic change can be mitigated, and that China is currently poorly suited 
to mitigate its demographic change—and evaluates how China’s mitigation potential 
might change in the future. This chapter also outlines areas where additional research 
could be conducted to further advance the understanding of the interaction between 
demographics and economics. The chapter concludes with the author’s thoughts on 
broader implications of demographic decline. 
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II. CHINA’S DEMOGRAPHIC HISTORY 
That China has the world’s largest population is widely known. Demography 
breaks down this single number by examining how the population of a country is 
structured in terms of age and gender, but also examines underlying trends like fertility 
and life expectancy. Understanding these elements allows the researcher to not only to 
grasp the composition of a current population, but also to accurately predict how this 
composition will change overtime. This chapter focuses on China’s demography, on how 
its population grew to where it is today and what its trajectory is for future generations. 
Figure 1 presents China’s population graphically, displaying the age and gender 
distribution of the approximately 1.4 billion people living in China in 2015. The 
population pyramid shows that China’s population is not uniformly distributed across 
ages and does not smoothly taper, but instead is marked by periods of population booms 
and population busts. This process has been occurring throughout history pre-dating the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Contributing to these 
earlier booms and busts were conflicts, famines, medical factors, cultural values, 
economic forces and a variety of other factors that shape population distribution across 
the world. This chapter and thesis in general focus on the period of time since the 
establishment of the PRC and examine how during this period governmental actions and 
more recently rapid economic growth have played roles in shaping this demographic 
distribution. Understanding how the present day population distribution has been 
developed will provide insight into the demographic challenge the PRC faces in its 




Figure 1.  China’s Population Pyramid in 2015 (1.4 billion).65 
To understand how governmental actions and economics have affected China’s 
demographic, this chapter reviews general population transition theory, then 
chronologically examines the history that has contributed to China’s demographic profile. 
The first period reviewed will start with the establishment of the PRC in 1949 through the 
death of Mao Zedong in 1976. This period is exemplified by generally pro-natal policies 
but also affected by unintended consequences of the Great Leap Forward and other 
policies not directly related to population size. The second era examined will be from 
1977 to the present. Hallmarks of this period include generally anti-natal policies like the 
One-Child Policy and also the effects of population transition under modernization. 
Finally, this chapter will examine the future demographic trends that are already 
developing due to China’s demographic history. Population trends tend to be sustaining 
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due to a concept called demographic momentum, so future demography is highly 
predictable from the present trends.66 
A. POPULATION TRANSITION THEORY 
Population transition theory or the demographic transition is “the process of 
modernization of the reproductive behavior in human populations.”67 As is the case in 
China, the reason or reasons that change in reproductive behavior occurs are debatable. 
Potential causal factors include declining mortality, changes in economic incentives 
associated with modernization, the spread of westernization, governmental policy or the 
spread of family planning education and technology.68 Aspects of all these potential 
factors are present in China. Regardless of the cause, the demographic transition is 
underway and shares characteristics with demographic transitions that have occurred 
before. The demographic transition is often described as a series of phases. These phases 
are graphically represented in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2.  Stages of Demographic Transition Model.69 
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69 From Drew Grover, “What is the Demographic Transition Model?” Population Education, posted 
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The factors that govern the speed of the transition are how quickly fertility has 
fallen and life expectancy increased. The pace at which nations proceed through these 
stages varies. The transitions occurring in the Asian countries of China, South Korea, and 
Japan have been notably faster than countries that experienced the transition at earlier 
times.70 Some researchers fear that the quickness of East Asia’s and more specifically 
China’s transition has the potential of “undermining economic growth and threatening 
social and political stability.”71  
1. Stage 1: High-Stationary or Pre-transition Phase 
The first phase is the high stationary phase or pre-transition phase, evidenced by 
high fertility and high mortality (low life expectancy).72 The archetypal pre-transition 
society would be a pre-modernization, agrarian society.73 Underdeveloped health care, 
poor sanitation and disease control, and inconsistent food supplies, combine to ensure 
that mortality rates are high.74 Fertility is also high, resulting in generally larger families. 
Several explanations are given to explain this tendency of family sizes tend to be large. 
Economically having many offspring can be beneficial to provide labor on farms or other 
family enterprises. High infant mortality also leads families to have more children to 
ensure a desire number reaches adulthood. Pre-modern societies also lack access to 
effective birth-control technologies and may also have pro-natal religious teachings.  
Pre-transition societies have relatively large populations of young people due to 
high fertility and family size. In turn, high mortality and short life expectancies shape the 
society’s population pyramid at older ages. During the first stage of the demographic 
transition high fertility contributes to a high rate of births or crude birth rate. Also during 
this phase high mortality contributes to a high rate of deaths or crude death rate. Since the 
birth rate and death rate are both high and in balance, population growth is generally low. 
In pre-modern societies this tended to be the case with the exception of large mortality 
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events, such as plagues, wars, or famines, which would cause a rapid decrease in 
population. The spread of modern medicine has ensured that no contemporary country 
any longer meets the crude death rate criteria of 30–50 per 1,000 that defines the pre-
transition stage.75 
2. Stage 2: Early Expanding 
The second stage of the demographic transition is brought on by a sustained 
decrease in mortality. For the demographic transition in Asia two potential explanations 
for this drop in mortality are given.76 The first more conventional explanation is that the 
transfer of medical technology and the growth of public health programs was the primary 
contributor to lowering mortality.77 Evidence for this includes the long list of health 
improvements that had been discovered or perfected in the western world that did not 
become common practice in much of Asia until the 1940s.78 A second view is that 
increased productivity in agriculture leads to adequate nutrition to reduce child 
mortality.79  Regardless which cause was predominant, their combined effect lowered 
mortality.  
As in the first stage or pre-transition phase during the second phase fertility 
remains high. The factors that lead to the reduction of mortality, such as advances in 
medical technology and public health or better nutrition, have no intrinsic negative effect 
on fertility. A potential increase in fertility is dampened because family size is not strictly 
limited by medical capability or nutritional availability. Instead, societal norms and 
economic factors play significant roles to stabilize family size decisions. Overall, 
declining mortality and steady fertility together lead to an imbalance between birth rates 
and death rates, with many more people being born than dying. The natural result of this 
imbalance is rapid population growth. Fertility rates during this stage remain high. 
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3. Stage 3: Late Expanding 
The third stage of a demographic transition is evidenced by a decrease in fertility. 
This decrease in fertility is caused not by medical factors limiting a women’s ability to 
conceive children, but instead factors of choice whether it be at the individual, societal, or 
governmental level that leads to women having fewer children. There are three necessary 
preconditions for this drop in marital fertility to occur: fertility rate must be an aspect of 
choice, lower fertility is desired, and fertility can be effectively controlled by medical or 
other techniques.80 As fertility declines, the crude birth rate or number of children born 
for every 1000 people also decreases. Theories addressing why this drop in fertility 
occurred vary but three oft-cited reasons are increased access to contraceptives, 
government policy, and family desires, which may be partially based on the economic 
costs and benefits of raising children.81 Regardless of the root cause, the drop in fertility 
to replacement levels or below has been experienced by every country of the developed 
world.82 While few would be surprised to see this evidence that the developed world has 
progress through this stage of its demographic transition, the more surprising fact is that 
the developing world has also progressed to at least this stage of its demographic 
transition if not beyond. Demographers Jackson and Howe have found in 2008 that “since 
1970, the average fertility rate in the developing world has dropped from 5.1 to 2.9 the 
rate of population growth has decelerated from 2.2 percent to 1.3 percent per year.”83 
This slowdown of population growth and fertility coming within balance with mortality 
represents the beginning of the fourth stage of the demographic transition.  
4. Stage 4: Low Stationary  
Many models of the demographic transition represent the fourth stage as the final 
stage of the transition. At this stage death rates and birth rates are low, fertility is at 
replacement levels and the total population is stable.84 This fourth stage of stability in 
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population size and a balance between death rates and birth rates was the expected final 
stage of the population transition.85 In much of the world, this stage of balance has been 
merely a new transition as fertility rates have continued to remain below replacement 
levels and consequently death rates are eventually destined to exceed birth rates. Most 
developed countries are currently in this fourth stage but, because fertility rates remain 
below replacement, they will not remain at this stage.86 
5. Stage 5: Decline 
Until recently the declining stage of demographic transition has been considered 
more theoretical than real, since only Japan was widely recognized to be experiencing 
it.87 Yet as global aging continues and fertility rates remain low the list of countries 
going into natural population decline continues to grow. The initial countries, in addition 
to Japan, were mainly former Soviet Republics, but the trend is spreading through 
southern Europe and is projected to begin to appear in the rest of Asia within the next 
decade.88 The explanation for the decline is that, after years of fertility below 
replacement level, the population is aging. This older population is contributing to the 
crude death rate at a higher pace than the smaller younger generation, with still low 
fertility, is contributing to the crude birth rate. The net result of this is quite simply that 
the natural population gradually begins to decline.  
Immigration has played an important role in preventing or reducing the amount of 
population decline in some countries. The general flow of immigration has been from the 
developing world to the developed as workers seek better economic opportunities in the 
developed world. The levels of immigration that each country experiences is dependent 
on many factors, including government policies, perceived economic opportunity, 
established immigrant communities, and proximity to sources of potential immigrants. 
While immigration has allowed much of the developed world to avoid overall population 
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decline, a state like Japan where immigration is low is experiencing the challenges of 
population decline in the fifth stage of its demographic transition. The developing world, 
the source of many of these immigrants, is in the midst of its own demographic transition 
and soon will be facing its own challenges of population decline.   
B. DEMOGRAPHIC PRESSURES UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF MAO 
(1949–1976) 
The demographics of present day China began to be shaped well before the 
establishment of the PRC in 1949. At this point China had already begun its demographic 
transition. In the period from 1950–1955, China’s crude death rate was down to 22.1 
deaths per thousand and its crude birth rate for the same period was 42.2 births per 
thousand.89 This places China at the founding of the PRC squarely in the second stage, 
the early expanding stage of its demographic transition. The population pyramid of China 
in 1950 reflects a nation with a large percentage of young people and a much smaller 
percentage of elderly people (see Figure 3).  
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Figure 3.  China’s Population Pyramid 1950 (540 million).90 
The vast majority of Chinese at this time were rural and poor. Life expectancies 
were still fairly low at 44.8 years for women and 42.3 years for men.91 The Chinese 
Communist Party had wrested power over mainland China from the Kuomintang and 
Mao Zedong was in charge. Under Mao, many of the government’s policies would 
indirectly have a significant impact in shaping the demographics of the nation. 
Coincidently, it is the generation born at the time of this transition that powered much of 
the growth of the Chinese economy to the size it is today. These workers have also now 
begun to leave the workforce, prompting many of the dire predictions about the potential 
future of the Chinese economy. 
One of the first policies of the Chinese Communist government that had an 
indirect effect on demographics was an egalitarian view of women. The PRC rhetorically 
supported gender equality as one of the goals of the revolution.92 Laws were passed to 
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provide equal access to education and end the practice of arranged marriages.93 While the 
implementation of these laws was inconsistent, certainly many women enjoyed more 
rights than they had under the previous government.94 This empowerment of women can 
be linked to a decrease in fertility as women take more control over decisions regarding 
family planning, usually leading to a smaller overall family size.95 The extent of the 
fertility decline that can linked to this change is unknowable, but it is one of many ways 
government policy has affected China’s demography. 
The Great Leap Forward (GLF) was a period of PRC history guided by an 
obsession with economic growth.96 During the GLF, China attempted to accelerate 
growth by maximizing the labor of its peasants. The quotas that farmers were required 
meet and give back to the government were based on unrealistic expectations. The 
necessity of meeting these quotas led to communes taking extreme measures like giving 
the produce they needed to live off of to make up for shortfalls. Officials were 
encouraged by the reports they received and continued to believe that even more 
production was possible. This became a cycle that drove the rural peasants to take 
additional desperate measures. Eventually, the reality of the peasants’ plight was revealed 
when a great famine hit many rural provinces. Estimates vary about the exact number 
who perished in the famine, but the estimate Naughton uses of 25–30 million excess 
deaths and 30 million postponed or missing births is widely cited.97 The demographic 
effects on the population were dampened by the overall size of the Chinese population 
(650 million) and the fact that the mortality affected a broad swath of the population 
instead of being concentrated to a specific age group or gender. The famine did create a 
spike in the crude death rate (CDR) between 1959 and 1961, but by the mid-1960s the 
crude death rate was back to its downward trend (see Figure 4). The crude birth rate 
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(CBR) also reflects the famine in that it fell dramatically during the GLF, but then was 
higher for years afterwards due to delayed births (see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4.  CBR, CDR and Population of China 1949–1996.98  
In Mao’s China, population policy was not a high priority of the government but 
instead an indirect effect of other policies. Under Mao’s leadership, China progressed 
through the second stage and into the third stage of its demographic transition. Mortality 
generally declined due to improvements in medicine and nutrition, with the exception of 
the period of the GLF famine. Overall, the population grew rapidly from about 550 
million to 900 million in just over two and a half decades. Fertility declined slightly but 
still remained relatively high.  
                                                 
98 From Total Population, Crude Death Rate, Crude Birth Rate, 1949–1996, China-Profile, (Data 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (various years): China Statistical Yearbook), last modified 
December 18, 2011, http://www.china-profile.com/data/fig_p_10.htm.  
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C. DEMOGRAPHIC PRESSURES IN THE POST-MAO ERA (1977–
PRESENT) 
In the years following Mao, the Chinese government would shift dramatically on 
population policies, making the control of population size an intended effect of policy. 
The first of these policies was in response to the baby boom that followed the GLF. This 
baby boom was in part caused by delayed births. During the GLF, many potential parents 
did not have children, merely struggling to survive themselves. After the GLF, as 
conditions were not so dire, these potential parents had children at a faster rate, making 
up for those delayed during the GLF. This fertility spike that began in the early 1960s 
continued into the early 1970s resulting in a rapid return to population growth. In 1968, 
neo-Malthusian Paul Ehrlich’s book, The Population Bomb, championed a renewed 
concern that population growth was outstripping the earth’s natural resources. Neo-
Malthusian fears of overpopulation were becoming a worldwide concern.99 The Chinese 
government, reacting to these fears and driven by the belief that population control was 
essential increasing per capita GDP, responded with policies to directly control 
population growth.100 The first of these campaigns was the “Later, Longer, Fewer” 
campaign.101 The campaign encouraged smaller family size by waiting longer to marry, 
having fewer children, and waiting longer between children.102 The demographic change 
that occurred during the campaign was dramatic, as within the span of a decade total 
fertility rate (TFR) dropped from 5.7 to 2.8 births per woman.103 
By 1980, despite the drop in fertility, China’s population continued to grow at a 
rapid pace. The CDR was actually increasing at this time.104 This is seemingly 
contradictory phenomenon is possible because of what both of the metrics measure. Total 
fertility rate (TFR), or often stated as just fertility, is the number of children that a 
notional woman would produce if she went through her entire child bearing period in the 
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calculation year. It is calculated for a given year but summing the average number of 
children born to women of each year of child-bearing age in that year. Therefore, it does 
not seek to represent any particular birth year of women, but instead represents the 
expected average number of children a woman would have if reproduction rates did not 
change for the entirety of her life. TFR is not sensitive to how many women of child 
bearing age there actually are as only the average woman of a particular age is used in the 
calculation. Crude birth rate (CBR) however is calculated by simply recording the 
average number of births per 1000 people of population. CBR is therefore very sensitive 
to the demographic composition of the population. For example, if a countries population 
is primarily elderly, its CBR will likely be very low because, for every woman of child-
bearing age, there will be many people beyond child bearing years. If a population is 
primarily composed of young people of child-bearing age, then even if fertility is low and 
each woman is having a small number of children the rate of children born to this 
population would be comparatively high.          
In China, the growth in population in the 1980s and the rise in crude birth rate 
was a result of the “echo-boom” as children born during the GLF boom reached 
reproductive age. China’s population pyramid for 1980 shows this situation; decreased 
fertility during the 1970s leads to few infants, and the echo boom on the cusp of reaching 
reproductive age (see Figure 5).  
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Figure 5.  China’s Population 1980 (984 million).105  
The government policy response to this rising population was the one-child 
policy, first announced in 1980.106 The one-child policy was introduced as an emergency 
measure, but has remained as the basis for Chinese population policy ever since.107 A 
true universal one-child policy would result in a TFR of 1. The fact that China’s total 
fertility rate has never been recorded as this low demonstrates that exceptions to the 
policy have always existed. Implementation of the policy has evolved over the decades in 
response to popular pressures and changing governmental concerns. With the one-child 
policy being the foundation of China’s population policy from 1980 until present, this 
section will address how implementation of the policy has evolved and the effect it has 
had on both the workforce and the gender balance in China. 
The one-child policy has never been implemented to the point where every couple 
in China only had one child. Due to popular pressures and the need for more labor on 
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farms, couples in rural China have been allowed a second child for almost the entirety of 
the policy.108 By the mid-1990s, implementation of the policy began to shift from “pure 
reliance on administrative coercion to greater emphasis on service provision.”109 In other 
words, while not completely dismantling the policy, the government tried to present a 
more palatable approach to family planning. Fertility levels continued to drop, but so too 
did the confidence that officials had in the reported numbers.110 As one-child policy 
adherence became an element that officials were evaluated upon, the numbers reported 
by these officials became more questionable.111 Fertility continued to drop with the 
policy but to what level became unknown. By 2000, China’s population census reported a 
total fertility rate of 1.22, well below replacement level.112 Replacement level fertility 
rate is around 2.1. This, over time, will lead to a stable overall population, as the average 
woman of child-bearing age produces a new potential mother and father, with a small 
extra to account for those who die before adulthood and the slight natural gender 
imbalance at birth. While fertility rate from the 2000 census of 1.22 number is widely 
considered erroneously low, the fact that China’s population growth had significantly 
slowed was widely accepted.113  China was by 2000 in the fourth stage of its 
demographic transition.  
With the one-child policy remaining in place, a new population concern has arisen 
in China in the past decade, that of worker shortages.114 China is beginning to experience 
the result of decades of fertility below replacement level—its population is growing 
older, and will eventually shrink. While overall population decline is still a future 
concern for China, as the nation grows older, the number of people leaving working age 
is exceeding those entering working age. This decline in the number of working age 
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individuals is at the center of the demographic and economic nexus that this thesis 
explores.  
Before focusing on the economic aspects of this and comparable demographic 
situations, one additional important impact of China’s one-child policy and its 
demographic future for China should be examined: China’s gender ratio has become 
unnaturally skewed as an unintended effect of the one-child policy. The natural gender-
ratio at birth is slightly more males than females, usually between 105–107 males per 100 
females with ratios above 105 at ages 0–4 indicating selection against females.115 
Chinese, like many other cultures, have a preference for sons.116 In China and other parts 
of East Asia this “preference is manifested in sex-selective abortions as well as in a 
gender bias in the care of female infants and children that results in excess female 
deaths.”117 The one-child policy has exacerbated this trend as parents allowed a strictly 
controlled number of children go to great lengths to ensure they have a son.118 The result 
of this has been has been an increase in the sex ratio.119 The sex ratio among 0–4 year 
olds was 120.2 males per 100 females in 2002.120 Comparing China to the worldwide 
number of 105.1 males per 100 females in 2002 makes it clear that China is experiencing 
a significantly abnormal gender distribution.121 Hudson and den Boer work Bare 
Branches: The Security Implications of Asia’s Surplus Male Population expounds on 
potential negative societal and economic effects of this imbalance. A central to aspect of 
these effects is the behavior of the excess bachelor population that imbalance creates.122 
These “Bare Branches” are prone to be underemployed or unemployed, lack strong ties to 
communities, participate in risky behavior including violent and criminal 
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behavior.123Women in societies with excess males have often seen their status decline, 
are more likely to be kidnapped or sold as brides, and have seen higher levels of 
prostitution.124 
Concerns over economic impacts, demographic impacts, the imbalanced gender 
ratio and human rights have led many to believe that the one-child policy should be 
repealed. The PRC has indeed begun loosening the policy: in 2013, the National People’s 
Congress, “adopted a proposal … that allows couples to have a second child if either of 
them has no siblings.”125 This is following a trend of relaxing the one-child policy from 
as early as the late 1990s.126 In addressing the gender ratio imbalance, the China Daily, 
published results of a study that found “no evidence for the traditional idea that having 
sons ensures better care in old age,” and that having a daughter as a first child could be 
correlated with being happier.127 China’s official policy is slowly shifting from anti-natal 
to more neutral. Demographers are pessimistic about sudden rebounds in fertility, but 
tend to agree that well designed pro-natal policies may help slow the decline of 
fertility.128 China’s policy still is far from pro-natal and even if an immediate increase in 
fertility was experienced from lifting the one-child policy, it would take decades for it to 
significantly alter the demographic momentum already established under the one-child 
policy.  
In discussing China’s demographics, policy, especially the one-child policy is 
often a primary focus. The preceding sections and other scholarly works demonstrate this 
repeatedly. Policies are accessible to scholars, they can be understood, they lend 
themselves to quantification and have specific start dates and end dates. Yet, especially in 
a population the size of China’s, policies can never be perfectly implemented and the 
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resulting demographic changes are a combination of many forces, most of which are 
much more difficult to quantify than policy. When considering demographic changes that 
have occurred in the Post-Mao era it is important to acknowledge that drops in fertility 
have occurred in developing societies around the world. China’s drop in fertility would 
have occurred as it has elsewhere without anti-natal policies, but these policies have 
augmented the change causing it to occur faster and to drop lower than would have 
occurred due to modernization alone. Evidence for this can be seen in the correlation in 
timing between the “Later, Longer, Fewer” campaign and the one-child campaign and the 
largest reductions of fertility.129 While correlation does not always indicate causation, 
these anti-natal policies have seemed to have an effect on China’s fertility rates.    
Since the founding of the PRC, China’s demographics have undergone a dramatic 
shift. China has moved from stage 2 to stage 4 of its demographic transition. Figure 6 
demonstrates how much China’s demographics have been reshaped over a period of 75 
years. This shift has transformed China’s society and economy. 
 
Figure 6.  China’s Population 1950 (543 million) (L), 1980 (984 million) (C), 
2010 (1,359 million) (R).130  
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D. FUTURE POPULATION TRENDS 
By understanding the current situation, elements of China’s demographic future 
are highly predictable. Demographic projections for the next several decades are highly 
predictable because the vast majority of those accounted for in the projections are already 
alive. This section will examine three aspects of China’s demographic future that may 
have important economic consequences: the shrinking of China’s working age 
population, which is already occurring; the aging of the population; and an increasing 
dependency ratio.  
1. Working-Age Population Decline 
Estimates differ on the exact year that China’s working age population will reach 
its peak, but they agree that it has already happened or will happen within the decade. 
The difference in estimates is not due to disagreement in the overall dynamics of China’s 
population, but instead differing definitions of the working age population. The World 
Bank, United Nations, and other international organizations generally use people aged 
15–64 as their definition of working age population. China’s own estimates for the peak 
are earlier because its definition is in line with its official retirement ages of 60 for men 
and either 50 or 55 for women. The estimates based on the working age standard of (15–
64) may overestimate the number of people who consider themselves potential workers. 
Regardless of the age used to define working age the population dynamic is unchanged: 
more people will be exiting the workforce by reaching retirement age than will be 
entering the workforce. The dynamic occurring in total working age population is charted 
in Figure 7. The economic impact of this is that China’s current growth model relying on 
increasing factor inputs, including labor, to achieve rapid growth cannot be sustained.131  
                                                 




Figure 7.  Working Age Population Decline in China.132 
2. Population Aging 
Aging presents a possible second pathway that demographic change will impact 
the economy. China’s median age will rapidly rise from 34.5 in 2010 to 48.7 by 2050.133 
For comparison, this increase is over 4.5 times (14.2 years to 3.1 years) the increase of 
the United States median age during this same period (36.9 to 40.0).134 Aging becomes 
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an economic concern because some evidence has suggests that as a workforce ages it, 
“become less dynamic and innovative and less able to adapt to rapid market and 
technological change.”135 Individual productivity suffers with age as physical capacity 
generally begins to deteriorate as early as 30, and deterioration of cognitive abilities 
begins as early as the mid-40s.136 If an older population leads to decreased productivity 
and innovation, it will have a negative impact on the Chinese economy. 
3. Increasing Dependency Ratio 
A third economic concern that occurs with aging is a rise in dependency ratio. 
The dependency ratio is the ratio of the population too young or too old to work divided 
by the number of working age people. Generally, speaking low dependency ratios are 
economically beneficial. In countries with low dependency ratios can focus more private 
and public investment can be spent on growing the economy instead of providing for 
those too young or old to work. Chapter four examines how China’s increasing 
dependency ratio compares with other aging societies. The overall effect of a higher 
dependency ratio is that fewer workers are supporting though taxes a larger number of 
people who are more likely to require government support. A particularly acute 
manifestation of this can be seen in “4-2-1” families, where as a result of the one-child 
policy, many individual workers are responsible for two parents and four grandparents in 
old age. This will prove an unwieldy burden on the youngest generation, meaning that 
aging Chinese, who have traditionally relied on their offspring during retirement, will 
instead be more likely to depend on state programs.137 High dependency ratios may mean 
that more private and public funds will have to be directed towards caring for the 
dependent population and less towards the investment that has financed Chinese 
economic growth.  
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E. CONCLUSION 
This section began with a review of population transition theory, which describes 
the shift “from a pre-modern regime of high fertility and high mortality to a post-modern 
one in which both are low.”138 This pattern has become universal with all countries in the 
modern world being able to be categorized in stages 2–5 of the continuum.139 By 
reviewing China’s demographic history its progress through the early stages of the 
transition under Mao was observed. Following Mao, the government’s policies designed 
to control population growth accelerated the transition by reducing the fertility rate. 
Presently, China is in the fourth stage of its demographic transition and will soon be 
entering the fifth stage of the transition. The demographic transition will cause potential 
economic hurdles as the working age population shrinks, rapid aging occurs in the 
population, and the dependency ratio rises.   
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III. COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES: GERMANY, JAPAN, AND
RUSSIA 
While China is the largest country facing the economic consequences of the fifth 
stage (natural population decline) of its demographic transition, it will not be the first 
country to do so. The demographic transition in China began later than the transitions in 
much of Western and Southern Europe, Russia, and Japan. These experiences provide 
potential case studies to examine the possible impacts on China. This chapter examines 
three comparison cases, Germany, Japan, and Russia, with the goal of understanding how 
the final stages of the demographic transition has impacted these countries’ economies, 
how the effects have been or can be mitigated, and if these effects are likely to occur in 
the Chinese economy. To accomplish this goal, the chapter provides an overview of the 
demographic and economic situation of these countries and then, thematically, examines 
economic challenges driven by this shared demographic situation.  
A. DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC OVERVIEWS 
1. Germany
The German economy has recently been seen as an economic bright spot 
surrounded by many struggling economies in Europe. The contrast is more evident when 
Germany is compared to the other low fertility countries of Western-Europe; Austria, 
Switzerland, Italy, Spain and Portugal.140 Germany is not only the largest economy of 
this group by far, it has also had one of the strongest economic growth rates among these 
countries during the recovery from the great recession (see Table 1). 
140 Jackson and Howe, Graying of the Great Powers, 42. 
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Table 1.   Economic Statistics of Western Europe’s  














(Billions U.S. $) 3,852 2,144 1,404 685 436 230 
Average GDP Growth 
Rate (2010-2013) 2.1% -0.5% -1.0% 2.0% 1.5% -1.2% 
 
Germany has also experienced an average gain in GDP per capita over the same 
period of 2.5% per year. The German economy is considered the economic engine of the 
European Union and has helped drive the post-recessionary recovery. 
The mathematical explanation of why GDP per capita is growing at a faster rate 
than aggregate GDP is that Germany is experiencing population decline. During this 
period Germany’s total population shrunk by over a million people or about 1% of 
total.142 Since the 1970s, Germany’s total fertility rate has remained below replacement 
levels (figures for East and West Germany combined prior to 1990).143  
As a result of these trends, Germany has experienced demographic events similar 
to those that China is experiencing and will experience within a generation. One of the 
first economically significant such events is the shrinking of the working-age population. 
Germany’s working age population peaked around 2000 and has begun a decline that will 
continue to increase in pace as more of the population reaches retirement (see Figure 8).  
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Figure 8.  German Population by Major Age Group.144 
Germany entered the fifth stage of its demographic transition around 2010 as its 
overall population began to shrink. These are the expected developments of countries as 
they enter the fifth stage of their demographic. Not only will China experience both of 
these transitions like Germany, there is remarkable similarity between Germany’s current 
population distribution and that which is projected for China in the year 2040 or about 25 
years from now (see Figure 9).  
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Figure 9.  Germany Population 2015 (L), China Projected Population  
2040 (R).145 
Despite these demographics the German economy is generally considered very 
strong. The economy has been resilient in the face of economic crisis both internationally 
and more locally in Europe.146 A recent OECD survey credits much of this strength to a 
“strong manufacturing sector and a robust labour market.”147 The survey raises several 
economic concerns that Germany is facing due to its demographic situation. The survey 
predicts that reduction in employment due to demographics will reduce potential growth 
by a fraction of a percent of GDP annually over much of the next two decades.148 Other 
demographic concerns include the budgetary impact of health and long-term care 
provision for a growing elderly population.149 Germany has made progress in dealing 
with demographic changes by implementing pension reforms that have reduced their 
impact on the budget.150 Germany has also been able to increase its labor force 
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participation despite a shrinking working-age population by including more older 
workers, women and immigrants.151 Germany has been able to continue to grow a strong 
prosperous economy despite its demographics by taking forward-looking policy action.  
2. Japan 
Japan has often been a leader in East Asia. It was the first East Asian country to 
win a war against a European power. It was the first East Asian country to industrialize 
and modernize. Japan was also the first East Asian country to experience the drop in 
fertility rates associated with modernization and its demographic transition. In much of 
the 20th Century, it was the largest Asian economy and at times during the late 20th 
Century, second only to the United States in economic size. Now, Japan is leading Asia 
and the world in demographic aging. This demographic situation is sometimes linked to 
the prolonged economic malaise that Japan is experiencing.  
Japan’s economic difficulties began during the 1990s, the “lost decade” which 
followed an asset price bubble collapse in the country. Anemic economic growth 
continued through the 2000s, despite government efforts, including the current slate of 
reforms known as Abenomics. Japan’s average annual GDP growth during the past two 
decades (1994-2014) has been 0.86%.152 This slow growth and associated deflationary 
pressures have “reduced Japanese living standards below the OECD average.”153  
Demographically, Japan has experienced the “perfect demographic storm: 
plunging fertility, soaring life expectancy, and negligible net immigration.”154 Japan’s 
fertility rate is currently among the world’s lowest and has remained below replacement 
levels for about two generations.155 The demographic outcome of this is that Japan’s 
working-age population began shrinking around 2000 and will continue to shrink (see 
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Figure 10). The OECD finds that rapid population aging, due to Japan’s demographics, is 
limiting Japan’s potential growth rate.156 
 
Figure 10.  Japanese Population by Age Group.157 
Despite an extended period of very low-fertility, Japan’s high longevity has 
delayed the fifth stage of its demographic transition to around 2005.158 Japan’s current 
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population distribution is similar to that projected for China around 2055 or 40 years 
from now (see Figure 11).  
 
Figure 11.  Japan Population 2015 (L), China Projected Population 2055 (R).159 
The economic impacts of demographics have been strongly felt in Japan. 
Elements that have dampened the demographic impact of labor force decline in Germany 
like immigration and female labor force participation are not as prevalent in Japan. A 
direct comparison of these aspects will be expanded upon later in this chapter. On the 
other hand, Japan has had success in keeping older workers in the work force, having the 
highest level of elderly-worker work force participation in the world.160 Japanese social 
conventions also provide some potential advantages to the government as it faces its 
growing aging population: Japanese elderly rely more highly on grown children and other 
family connections during retirement and less on public pensions than in other areas of 
the developed world.161  
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The Russian economy is currently in sharp decline due to the combined effects of 
low oil prices and economic sanctions in put in place due to events in Crimea and 
Ukraine. The large reliance on extractive economic activity makes the Russian economy 
particularly vulnerable to global commodity prices. While commodity prices and the 
sanctions regime will greatly affect the Russian economy in the short and potentially 
medium term, neither of these elements is directly related to Russia’s demographic 
situation. This supports the idea that while demographics may play a significant role in 
long-term economic growth, short-term events can cause spikes or slow-downs in growth 
that temporarily overcome long-term effects like demographics.  
Demographically, Russia is unique among the countries in this study in that its 
peak working-age population occurred after its peak total population. Russia entered the 
fifth stage of its demographic transition in mid-1990s, as total population began to a 
decline.162 Its working-age population is actually just now peaking. This is the 
unfortunate effect of Russia’s low life-expectancy (67.2 years) being nearly the same as 
the nominal end of a person’s working years.163 Instead of enjoying many years in 
retirement, if Russians worked until 65 or the aged used by many international 
organizations to define retirement they would be on average a few years from death. 
Whereas in Japan and Germany the number of elderly people has grown rapidly, in 
Russia this population is not projected to grow significantly in number, but will grow 
eventually as a percentage of overall population due to a decline in the working age 
population (see Figure 12). 
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Figure 12.  Russian Population by Age Group.164 
The combination of Russia’s low fertility and low life expectancy provides cause 
for concern. Russia’s low life expectancy is blamed in part on “risky lifestyles, 
prodigious rates of per capita alcohol consumption, and [a] crumbling health-care 
system.”165 Economically, these health factors and low life expectancy have the potential 
to “slowly erode a nation’s human capital.”166 There is also concern that low life 
expectancy is economically harmful by discouraging future-oriented saving and 
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investment.167 The government has begun to provide incentives to increase fertility, but 
“experience suggests that the impact on fertility of support provided around the time of 
birth is most likely temporary, as it only accelerates but does not increase the number of 
childbirths.”168  
While Russia’s short and medium term growth will be highly dependent on the 
non-demographic factors of commodity prices and sanctions regimes, a demographic 
effect on Russia’s long-term economic trajectory seems likely. If the Russian economy 
recovers from low-commodity prices and sanctions are removed it is expected that life 
expectancy will increase in line with higher incomes.169 If this occurs future pension cost 
will increase. The current political administration has ruled out increases to the low 
retirement age of 60 for men and 55 for women, but a policy that links these ages to a 
growing life expectancy will become needed to contain pension costs.170 Other long-term 
economic demographic effects in Russia include loss of productivity due to the erosion of 
human capital. One potential benefit for the Russian economy is that employment of 
older workers is highly concentrated in low-productivity Soviet era companies.171 If 
future, highly educated workers are enabled to enter more productive enterprises overall 
productivity could rise.172 Completing Russia’s transition to a market oriented economy 
and reducing cronyism and corruption is key to releasing the potential of these future 
generations.173  
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B. COMMON ECONOMIC-DEMOGRAPHIC THEMES 
In reviewing the economic and demographic situations of Germany, Japan, and 
Russia several consistent themes arise that link their demographic and economic 
situations. The case comparison illuminates key differences between the economies that 
are successfully navigating a demographic decline and those that struggle, demonstrating 
that challenging demographics alone is not deterministic of economic potential. For 
countries approaching the fifth stage of their demographic transition like China, 
emulating the attributes of economies that have successfully managed their demographic 
picture should help during their own transition. Two general economic concerns are 
linked with demographic decline: a shrinking labor force and increasing public spending 
on benefits for the elderly. To respond to a shrinking labor force more productive 
economies seem able to utilize a high percentage of potential workers and also allocate 
workers to high productivity areas. Controlling public benefits is a political problem that 
also is affected by society expectations. This section will review how these case study 
economies have performed in these areas of utilizing potential workers, enabling 
allocation of labor to higher productivity areas, and controlling benefits. 
1. Maximizing Labor Force 
As the working age population shrinks, economies must find a way to replace 
these workers or risk economic decline. Often, strong economies are able to incorporate 
workers from areas of society that may have been previously marginalized from the work 
force. The direction of causality for this trend is debatable. Economies may be able to 
thrive because they are able find productive use for people previously out of the 
workforce or it may be that thriving economies drives up incentives (wages) which 
encourages those outside the workforce to join in. It appears at least likely that a 
correlation will occur as healthy economies pull in workers. As economies modernize, 
three population segments that often have the potential for providing new workers are 
females, the elderly, and immigrants.  
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a. Female Employment
In modern economies female participation in the work force has increased 
everywhere, but the level to which it has increased has much to do with societal norms 
and the support and opportunity women are provided to enter the workforce. Female 
labor force participation rates provide the most basic measure of the extent to which 
women have been included in the workforce. Using this measure, Germany has the 
highest female employment rate, while the low female employment rate for Japan and the 
gender gap is striking, at nearly twice that of Germany or Russia (Table 1). Another 
measure of this is the Gender Inequality Index (GII) produced by the United Nations 
Development Programme that can provide insight to the equality of opportunity for 
females. In this index both Germany and Japan are in the most equal category of Very 
High Human Development, while Russia is in the next category of High Human 
Development (see Table 2). Germany’s strong economy leads the comparison economies 
in integrating women into its workforce. 
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Table 2.   Female Employment Opportunities.174 
 
                                                 
174 Male and Female Employment Rates from OECD Surveys: Germany (2012), Japan (2013), Russia (2012); GII Rank from United Nations Development 
Programme, Human Development Reports, “Table 4: Gender Inequality Index,” August 16, 2015, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/table-4-gender-inequality-index; 
employment rate difference calculated by author.  
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b. Elderly Employment 
A second potential source of additional workers is the elderly. Adding older 
workers or extending the working lifetime of those in the workforce is not without some 
concerns as discussed earlier. Regardless of the potential negatives of productivity 
decline and overly conservative actions, older workers can help keep an economy 
growing and also provide income potential for elderly that may displace some of the 
government’s financial burden.175  The participation of elderly workers in an economy 
depends on the health of these workers and often on the government’s retirement polices. 
Japan, of the comparison countries, has the healthiest elderly workers based on life 
expectancy at age 60 and also workers in Japan retire at a later age (see Table 3). Despite 
similar official retirement ages in Germany and Japan, the effective retirement age, or 
average age in which older employees leave the workforce for at least 5 years is much 
higher in Japan. Japan has led the comparison countries in employing elderly workers and 
this is enabled by the better health at older ages that Japanese enjoy.  
Table 3.   Comparison of Health and Retirement Ages.176 
 
                                                 
175 Jackson and Howe, Graying of the Great Powers, 112. 
176 Life Expectancy at Age 60 from UNdata, “Life Expectancy at Age 60,” August 26, 2015 (Source: 
WHO data), https://data.un.org; Normal Retirement Age from OECD, Pensions at a Glance 2013: 
OECD and G20 Indicators (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013). 256, 289, 325, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/pension_glance-2013-en; Effective Retirement Age from OECD, 
“Expected Years in Retirement,” in Society at a Glance 2014: OECD Social Indicators (Paris: 
OECD Publishing, 2014), 105, DOI : http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/soc_glance-2014-15-en. 
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c. Immigrant Employment 
A third way to maximize a labor force despite challenging demographics is to 
import labor in the form of immigrants. Immigration is a controversial issue in countries 
around the world. Some native-born workers are concerned that they will be displaced in 
their jobs or that the influx of labor will drive down wages. Other countries, especially 
largely homogenous ones, deal with concerns that immigrants threaten their national 
identity. Overall, economic analysis suggests substantial benefits to countries that receive 
immigrants. Employers gain from increased competition in the labor market and the 
public gains from less expensive products and services.177 The economic effect of 
immigrants would seem even more valuable to countries facing potential labor shortfalls 
due to demographic decline. Several factors drive the rate of flow for immigrants, 
including proximity, economic opportunity, legal restrictions, existing immigrant 
communities, and the ability for immigrants to culturally assimilate in a potential 
destination country. This section examines the net migration rate (per 1,000 population) 
to compare which countries are receiving the largest percentage of immigration. 
Immigration can help make up for loses due to demographic decline, but is almost never 
sufficient to completely overcome these loses (see Table 4). 
Table 4.   Net Migration, Crude Birth, and Death Rates.178 
 
                                                 
177 Thomas A. Pugel, International Economics, 15th ed., international edition (New York, NY: 
McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2012), 368. 
178 Net Migration Rate, Crude Death Rate, and Crude Birth Rate for period (2010-2015) from United 
Nations, World Population Prospects, 320, 409, 634; Difference between CBR and CDR authors 
Calculation. 
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In terms of maximizing the labor force, Germany has done best at inclusion of 
females, Japan at inclusion of elderly, while all countries have net inward migration rates 
but at levels lower than the natural decline of the population. Getting more workers from 
a shrinking working age population is one way of mitigating the economic effect of 
demographic decline. A second mitigation method is using the existing workers more 
productively by enabling labor to move from areas of low productivity to high 
productivity.  
2. Labor Productivity 
Isolating and measuring the productivity of labor alone provides some analytical 
challenges. A basic measure is simply dividing GDP by workers. This would provide an 
indication on average how much contribution to GDP each laborer in an economy 
produces. Analytical concerns with this measure include the innate concerns with the 
accuracy of GDP as a measure of output; in addition, other productivity factors such as 
capital and technology impact the result.179 Another possible way of measuring labor 
productivity is to make the basic assumptions that wages are related to how much a 
worker produces and that workers will tend to take the highest wage job possible. While 
this method clearly has flaws it can generally be assumed that in a labor market based on 
market principles labor will generally be driven to productive use. With these 
assumptions then the more open the labor market will allow labor to enter higher 
productivity sectors. The Heritage Foundation produces an index that attempts to measure 
labor freedom by considering elements like legal factors related to hiring, firing, and 
wage regulations.180 Another useful index is The World Bank’s Doing Business index, 
which measures how easy it is for a business to be conducted. It can be assumed that in a 
country where businesses can easily be created strong market forces will improve overall 
productivity. Where competition is stifled, as in the case of monopolies or when state 
owned enterprises are not forced to compete in an open market, companies are generally 
                                                 
179 OECD, Measuring Productivity –OECD Manual: Measurement of Aggregate and 
Industry-Level Productivity Growth (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2001), 14, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264194519-en.   
180 “Labor Freedom,” The Heritage Foundation, 10 Jul 2015, http://www.heritage.org/index/labor-
freedom.  
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much less efficient at using labor and other resources. By examining all these measures 
some conclusions can be made about how productively labor is used in each country (see 
Table 5).  
Table 5.   Productivity/Labor and Business Freedom Scores.181 
 
The more developed state of the German and Japanese economy leads to a higher 
GDP per person employed due in part to the higher level of capital available for each 
worker. Surprisingly, Japan, which is known for its lifelong employment norm, does very 
well in labor freedom. The labor freedom index measures legal restrictions on hiring and 
firing, but does not try to measure ingrained business norms. This helps explain the 
seeming disconnect in the Japanese score along with the fact that the Japanese economy 
has been evolving away from the lifelong employment practice. Overall, the German and 
Japanese economies appear to be more agile than the Russian economy in allowing for 
labor to move to the most productive uses. Particularly worrisome in the Russian 
economy is the high level of state owned enterprises.182 From the OECD report, “the 
continued dominance of the largest SOEs, which seem to have privileged access to 
finance, has an important impact on the economy, as it complicates market entry and 
suffocates competition, while preserving pockets of inefficiency.”183 As labor becomes 
                                                 
181 GPD per Person from The World Bank, August 16, 2015, http://datacatalog.worldbank.org; Labor 
Freedom Score from “2015 Index of Economic Freedom,” The Heritage Foundation, 
http://www.heritage.org/index/explore; Doing Business Score 2015 from “Doing Business Report Series,” 
World Bank Group, http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports. 
182 OECD, Russian Federation 2013, 61. 
183 Ibid. 
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more constrained, moving workers from generally inefficient SOEs or other areas of low 
productivity to more productive uses can significantly boost economic growth.   
3. Controlling Old-Age Benefits 
While demographic change has a direct economic impact through its impact on 
the labor force, there is also an indirect impact on the effect of demographic change due 
to the growing elderly population. As the population ages the percentage of retirees 
increases, which can in turn put pressure on government finances. This pressure is two-
fold as fewer laborers are contributing taxes and more elderly are in need of health-care, 
pensions and other benefits provided by the government. Several datasets provide insight 
into the potential impact of these trends. One of the most important is the old-age 
dependency ratio, or the ratio of elderly people 65 and above to working age people 15–
64. The dependency ratio will vary from each country depending at where they are in 
their demographic transition and also how dramatically the transition has occurred. The 
current percent of GDP spent on public pensions also provides insight into how much 
economies are currently being burdened by retirees. This section also examines how long 
retirees spend in retirement. Life expectancy and government policy on nominal 
retirement age can either shorten or lengthen this period. The general rule is that the 
longer elderly spend in retirement the more expensive it is likely to be for society to 
ensure those elderly receive their benefit entitlements. The elements combined provide a 
picture of how expensive care is for elderly and will be for each economy (see Table 6). 
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Table 6.   Dependency Ratios and Spending on Public Pensions.184 
 
 
Care for the elderly is currently least expensive as percent of GDP spent on public 
pensions in Russia. This is due to a low old-age dependency ratio and shorter time spent 
in retirement due to shorter life expectancies. As the old-age dependency ratio rises and if 
life expectancies rise closer to those found in most of the developed world, Russia’s 
lower nominal retirement ages will become increasingly more expensive for the 
government to support. The current statistics for Russia may underestimate the true old-
age dependency ratio. For comparability, dependency ratio uses age 65 and above as the 
beginning for “dependency” for all countries regardless of actual retirement age. Russia’s 
young official retirement ages means that the population above its official retirement but 
below 65 are not defined as dependent by dependency ratio though in reality they may 
rely on state benefits. Germany faces increasing old-age dependency ratios and has 
already begun gradually increasing the nominal retirement age to 67.185 Japan has also 
pursued benefits reform to control the future expense of its elderly population. As the 
developed world ages, elderly benefit spending will consume more government 
resources. The impact of this in a fiscally constrained environment may be the crowding 
                                                 
184 2015 and 2050 Old-age Dependency Ratios from United Nations, World Population Prospects, 
320, 409, 634; % GDP Spent on Public Pensions from OECD, Pensions at a Glance 2013, 256, 289, 
325; Expected Years in Retirement from OECD, “Expected Years in Retirement,” 105; Nominal 
Retirement Age from OECD, Pensions at a Glance 2013, 256, 289, 325. 
185 OECD, Pensions at a Glance 2013, 256. 
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out of investments that could have contributed to stronger economic growth. This makes 
controlling the cost of these benefits essential to future economic strength. 
C. COMPARISON CONCLUSIONS 
Germany, Japan, and Russia have been grappling with demographic challenges 
similar to those that are looming in China. Although the demographic challenges are 
similar across the three countries, the economic impact of these challenges varies 
dramatically. Elements like maximizing the available labor force, allowing labor to be 
used in the most productive manner, and minimizing the cost of the elderly have 
contributed to the different economic strength of these comparison states. While no 
countries demographics will be exactly the same, each of the comparison countries is 
experiencing the fifth stage of their demographic transitions with declining working-age 
and total populations. If this demographic factor was solely deterministic for a country’s 
economic destiny, then similar demographic structures would invariably lead to similar 
economic outcomes, but this is clearly not the case.  
The German economy appears the strongest of the case studies. It benefits from 
its higher level of female employment and levels of immigration that replace 
approximately half the natural decline of the population. The economy is friendly to new 
productive businesses, leading to the productive use of labor. Yet the growing number of 
elderly workers will place increasing stress on the government’s budget in the future.   
The Japanese economy has suffered through a long period of slow but generally 
positive growth. Its very healthy population has extended the working life of many of 
citizens contributing to the labor force and simultaneously has provided the elderly with 
income separate from government benefits. Immigration is not nearly as a significant 
resource for new labor as it is in either Germany or Russia. Japan’s economy generally 
scores well in productivity measures.  
The Russian economy has been hit hard by non-demographic concerns but also 
seems likely to be poorly prepared for demographic aging. Its citizens leave the work 
force early due to poor health and it has maintained low retirement ages. The extractive 
nature of much of its economy and the legacy of the Soviet economy has combined to 
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keep productivity low and discourage more efficient business challengers. A macabre 
benefit of Russia’s low life expectancy has been to keep its dependency ratio lower as 
well. If Russia can improve its life expectancy a rising population of retirees will likely 
force it to increase its official retirement age.  
Demographic change is an impactful economic event, but its effects can be 
shaped and mitigated. Using the same standards for comparison the next chapter will 
explore how the Chinese economy compares to these cases and what this indicates for the 
future of Chinese economic growth. 
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IV. THE CHINESE ECONOMY AND DEMOGRAPHIC 
MITIGATION POTENTIAL 
The previous chapter has shown several potential effects of and mitigation 
strategies for economies facing the decline stage of the demographic transition. The 
evidence illustrates that demographics play a role in economic matters, and also that this 
effect can be shaped. This thesis seeks to understand how similar demographic effects 
might influence the Chinese economy. To assess this impact, this chapter will provide a 
brief overview of the development of the modern Chinese economy. The narrative history 
provides insight into why China’s labor market evolved into its present form. With this 
path of development as context, the comparison economics are used as a baseline to 
assess how China may fare when demographic decline begins to impact the labor market. 
This is conducted by using the same metrics as the previous chapter to assess China’s 
readiness for its demographic challenges, in comparison to the economies reviewed in 
Chapter Three.  
A. CHINESE ECONOMIC OVERVIEW 
This overview will focus on the same period of time as the demographic review of 
China, beginning with the founding of the PRC in 1949. As outlined in the second 
chapter, the PRC’s economic history can be described in two periods. The first period 
was an economy guided by communist ideology. The second period included a gradual 
and incremental break from the communist command economy to a market-based 
economy. The beginnings of this transition can be observed as early as 1978 and is still a 
work in progress.186 Following the overview of general economic reform, the effect of 
reform on the labor market will be examined in greater depth.  
1. Communist Command Economy (1949–1977) 
When the CCP wrested power from the Chinese Nationalists in 1949 the Chinese 
economy and China in general had been decimated by war. During the previous decades, 
                                                 
186 Naughton, The Chinese Economy, 85. 
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China had suffered the ravages of an Imperial Japanese invasion. The Japanese presence 
then made China a battlefield for World War II. Finally, after uniting in the effort to 
defeat the Japanese, Chinese Communists and Nationalists fought each other in a bitter 
civil war. During this series of wars, vital agricultural infrastructure and manufacturing 
capital was destroyed, damaged or neglected.187 During the final years of the Chinese 
Civil War, the Nationalist government failed in managing the economy and 
hyperinflation added to the economic tumult.188  
For the next three decades communist ideology and Mao Zedong would guide the 
economy. Economists have developed vocabulary for economic swings experienced by 
market-based economies, booms and busts, bulls and bears, etc. These terms fail to 
adequately describe the economic roller-coaster that occurred when market mechanisms 
are removed and the economy becomes a manifestation of ideology and political power 
struggles. Mao Zedong, the most influential person in all aspects of Chinese life 
including the economic sphere, “repeatedly changed economic policies in accordance 
with his own revolutionary ideals or personal wishes.”189 Naughton notes that a general 
pattern emerged where the economy suffered when the government’s ideological fervor 
dominated and recovered when the government loosened its grip on the economy. As he 
describes, the period from establishment of the PRC in 1949 through the Great Leap 
Forward in 1961 demonstrates these cycles.190  
In the first few years (1949–1952) after independence the CCP was pragmatic and 
the economy performed well. The hyperinflation that marked the end of the Nationalist 
era was brought under control, land reform empowered peasants by giving them the land 
they worked, and relative peace allowed industry to quickly recover. The recovery of the 
economy encouraged the leadership to begin more aggressively pursuing a Soviet style 
economy. 
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Following this period the government began more aggressively pushing through 
ideological socialist reforms that abolished private property and enterprise. The very 
nature of the economy was changed to resemble the Soviet model of a socialist economy. 
Public ownership is a hallmark of this economic model: from 1954 to 1956 nearly all 
farms were turned into collectives or cooperatives and private factories or businesses 
almost universally became publically controlled. By 1956, China had truly become a 
socialist economy. 
Ironically, it was also 1956 that Nikita Khrushchev spoke out against the excesses 
of socialism under Stalin in the Soviet Union. In this environment, and due to the 
difficulties being faced in the Chinese economy due to its rapid transformation, the 
Chinese leadership responded by moderating its ideological drive and allowing dissenting 
voices in the “Hundred Flowers” campaign. During this two year period from 1956–57, it 
appeared that China might develop an economic brand of socialism that was more market 
friendly, adaptable, and likely more successful than the Soviet command economy. 
This hope was quickly dashed by a reversal led by Mao, as he suddenly initiated a 
campaign to punish those who had spoken out during the Hundred Flowers campaign. 
Unsatisfied by economic growth to this point and meeting constraints limiting faster 
growth, the Great Leap Forward (GLF) initiative attempted to rapidly increase 
development through the sheer labor and determination of the people. Instead of 
incremental developmental steps, the vision of the GLF was to make giant leaps by doing 
everything at once. When manic effort failed to meet the expectations, regional 
administrators began to exaggerate their production to at least meet the requirements on 
paper. In turn the reports of increasing production led to increased production targets in a 
continuous feedback cycle. More and more drastic measures began to occur in the 
villages and countryside as peasants turned useful tools into useless steel in backyard 
steel mills to meet steel production quotas, and farmers attempted to meet agriculture 
quotas by turning over to the Party the grain they needed to survive. The tragic result of 
this madness was the famine of 1960–61, where 25 to 30 million lives were lost.  
The GLF was the most extreme of the damage brought on by the Maoist 
government but the pattern continued throughout Mao’s leadership as perceived threats 
 64 
or ideological goals led to government intervention in the economy with often disastrous 
results. Comparing the Maoist economy in similar terms to the modern economies from 
the previous chapter provides some insight to its struggles. The economy was highly 
unproductive, with virtually complete government ownership and control eliminating the 
competition that would have been vital to increasing productivity. Labor was used 
inefficiently: while a large labor force existed, government control over where people 
worked ensured that market mechanisms to direct labor to its most productive uses did 
not exist.191  
2. Reforms to a Market-Based Economic System (1978–present) 
The death of Mao brought the opportunity for a transformation of the economy. 
The desire for reform stemmed from two factors. First, economically China had fallen 
behind its East Asian neighbors.192 Second, food shortages still threatened to the country 
and fears of a repeat of the GLF famine existed.193 China in many ways developed its 
own reform path, taking its successful East Asian neighbors economies as model but not 
making a market economy an expressed goal.194 Reform was driven by the sense change 
was needed. It was a moment in PRC history when economic experimentation was not 
forbidden by ideological dogmatism. Deng Xiaoping famously compared the 
experimental and uncertain nature of the reforms to a man walking across a river by 
feeling for the stones.195 
Reform began gradually in agriculture. These initial reforms returned control of 
farms to households instead of state run collectives. Additionally, production in excess of 
government quotas could be sold, which “reinstated the link between effort and reward 
throughout rural China.”196  The result was a dramatic increase in the production of these 
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farms. Not only were the farmers producing more, they were doing it more productively 
and decreasing the amount of time spent farming.197 This excess labor shifted to locally 
run factories that experienced a surge in production.198 These factories, known as 
township and village enterprises (TVEs), began to compete with the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) revealing how inefficient the SOEs were.199 The successes of these 
initial reforms provided reformers the confidence to continue and created a population 
base of support and even desire for more reform.200 
Continued reform developed into the dual track pricing system. Dual track 
provided a type of compromise between a centrally planned economy and a free market 
economy.201 Under dual track a set amount of goods were allocated to the government at 
a fixed price, while any production beyond that was sold on an open market. In addition 
to permitting the development of markets, the government allowed control of economic 
decisions to shift from central planners to local managers in charge of individual 
enterprises. These economic reforms enabled market mechanisms to impact enterprise 
decisions making and gave local managers the authority to make these decisions. 
Economic cycles were experienced but were driven by macroeconomic forces instead of 
ideological interventions in the economy. This instability challenged the ability of 
economic planners and also challenged the social cohesion of the PRC.202  
The confluence of these forces contributed to the unrest that led to the Tiananmen 
Square protest of 1989. Specific economic grievances that contributed to the discontent 
leading to the protests including rising prices due to inflation and perceptions of 
corruption in those empowered by the state.203 Reformist leaders initially refused to 
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disperse the protest; finally, conservative leaders ordered the military action that violently 
cleared the square of protestors.204 The unrest and the failure of reformist leaders to 
restore order led to a brief period of anti-reform dominance. Conservatives attempted to 
reverse course on reforms but their attempts failed and market forces quickly acted to 
correct imbalances in the economy.205 The failure of the brief anti-reform movement 
eroded remaining support among Communist Party leaders for a return to the old 
economic system and ushered in a new enthusiasm for reform.206  
This second phase of reform continued to move towards a fully market based 
economy. Deng Xiaoping’s “Southern Tour” in 1992 is seen as a symbolic beginning of 
this movement returning to pragmatic market-based reform policies and opening up to 
globalization.207 With this new push some of the remaining vestiges of the old command 
economy began to fade. The dual track system was abolished in favor a fully market 
based economy in 1993.208 Also in 1993, the Company Law gradually shifted many 
SOEs to limited-liability corporations—not complete privatization, but a step closer.209 
The 1990s also saw a significant increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 
Chinese economy. In the decades prior, companies had been reluctant to invest in China 
due to an immature legal framework and concerns they would be left without recourse to 
protect their investments from political authorities.210 FDI began to increase with the 
development of the legal system and political support for investment. In addition to 
money, foreign investment brought with it market access, technology and manufacturing 
know how.211 
The Chinese export economy began to thrive by using its comparative advantage 
of low cost labor to become a leader in low value-added manufacturing. As exports 
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became an increasing part of the economy, China pursued further integration in the global 
market. An important milestone in this pursuit was the 2001 ascension of China into the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). This step provided impetus for additional reform as 
the WTO membership process required China to accede to international standards on 
economic issues including labor regulations and market openness.212  WTO membership 
also put pressure on SOEs for continued reform. WTO regulations attempted to limit 
protectionist policies that SOEs had benefited from and also introduced foreign 
competition, breaking up monopolies that many SOEs enjoyed.213 
Since the turn of the century China has continued to mature as a market based 
economy and rapidly has developed into the world’s leading exporter (see Figure 13).   
 
Figure 13.  Exports (Billion $).214 
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Overall, Chinese GDP grew at an average of 10% per year for 3 decades from 
1983 to 2013.215  During this period China went from being the twelfth largest economy 
in the world, with a GDP comparable to Switzerland, to the second largest economy only 
behind the United States.216 During this period, GDP per capita increased from $224 in 
U.S. dollars in 1983 to $7594 in 2014.217 While China’s growth has made some Chinese 
extremely wealthy overall, the rising economic tide has truly lifted all ships. China’s after 
tax Gini coefficient, a commonly used measure of inequality, is moderately high (0.41), 
but only slightly more inequitable than the United States (0.38).218 More impressively 
during its economic reform from 1981–2010, China lifted over 680 million people out of 
extreme poverty (defined as earning less than $1.25 per day).219  The effect of this 
extraordinary economic growth has been increased standards of living and expectations 
for the Chinese people. This in turn created a burgeoning domestic market that has grown 
increasingly important. 
Despite the rapid growth of the Chinese economy there are still significant 
economic concerns. China has not fully transformed into a capitalist economy. The 
Communist Party and government still play a significant role in the economy. At times 
this role is direct, as in the case of the much reduced but still large number of SOEs in 
China. Political influence in investment and infrastructure development has also created 
concerns of white elephant projects and other economically unsound investments. Other 
less direct effects include the political influence that pervades the financial system 
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including the government owning controlling shares of China’s major banks.220 Political 
pressures led to banks making loans to state firms that were economically unsuitable for 
such loans.221 Additional concerns include an immature legal system, which at times has 
also bent to political pressures, and the environmental impact of China’s growth. China’s 
reforms have been incredibly successful in lifting much of the country out of abject 
poverty, but the reform is incomplete.   
The transformation of the economy has changed the economic prospects of 
Chinese citizens, in terms of both their consumer and worker roles. Since the impending 
demographic decline will greatly affect labor, it is important to understand how the 
Chinese labor market has been reformed with the economy as a whole.   
3. Labor Reforms 
Over the course of the economic reforms, the labor market in China has been 
established and gone through a transformation. As reforms began, the vast majority of 
Chinese workers were rural and working in agriculture (see Table 7). Reforms 
significantly improved the productivity of the primary sector and facilitated shifting of 
labor from the primary sector to other sectors of the economy. In these other sectors 
which even more radical transformation occurred as the economy shifted away from the 
central planning of the Soviet System towards market-based capitalism.  
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Table 7.   Employment Trends.222 
Year Sector (%) Residence (%) SOE share of 
Urban 
Employment 
Primary Secondary  Tertiary Urban Rural 
1978 70.5 17.3 12.2 23.7 76.3 78.3 
1985 62.4 20.8 16.8 25.7 74.3 70.2 
1995 52.2 23.0 24.8 28.0 72.0 59.1 
2005 44.8 23.8 31.3 36.0 64.0 23.7 
2013 31.4 30.1 38.5 49.7 50.3 16.6 
 
When reforms began in the urban economy almost 4 out of every 5 workers 
worked for state-owned enterprises under the central planning of the Communist Party. 
Under central planning workers were assigned to a job and expected to remain there for 
the entirety of their working lives. Leaving a job in search of a better opportunity simply 
did not happen, but unemployment also practically did not happen as employment was 
essentially guaranteed by the state. This system attempted to guarantee a minimum 
standard of living, the so called “iron rice bowl,” and reinforced the state’s role in daily 
economic life. The implicit promise of the “iron rice bowl” was a secure job and care for 
life as long as one stayed in line politically.   
Reform of this system of lifetime employment began in the mid-1980s. In an 
effort to make SOEs more competitive the Communist Party began giving SOE managers 
more autonomy including more control over the wages SOEs paid to workers.223 In 1986, 
                                                 
222 After Cai, Park, and Zhao, “Chinese Labor Market,” 168; The primary sector consists collecting 
natural products including agriculture, mining, forestry, etc. The secondary sector consists of 
manufacturing and construction. The tertiary sector is comprised of services; 2013 data from “China 
Statistical Yearbook 2014,” National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2014/indexeh.htm 
223 Cai, Park, and Zhao, “Chinese Labor Market,” 171. 
 71 
the concept of temporary employment or labor contracts was introduced to allow SOEs to 
gain or drop workers depending on market conditions.224 In the mid-1990s, SOEs slowly 
began to lay off workers as they faced pressure to move toward profitable operation 
under the Company Law.225 Layoffs brought a new concern since social insurance 
benefits such as pension and housing had always been tied to the company; laid off 
employees stood to lose significantly without a social safety net.226 The Labor Law and 
other measures during the late 1990s attempted to address these concerns and also 
provide basic worker rights, but implementation has been slow.227 In 1997, the still 
unprofitable and unsustainable SOEs were aggressively restructured.228 During this time 
from 1997–2004 over 27 million SOE workers were laid off as the SOEs trimmed their 
workforce from 107 million to 64 million.229 Additional social assistance programs were 
instituted with or in response to this, including a welfare like minimum living standard 
program (1998) and standardized unemployment insurance (1999).230  
These reforms have helped to create a functioning labor market, where employees 
have the freedom to move between jobs without risking the total loss of benefits, and 
firms have the ability to make employment and compensation decisions based on market 
forces.231 As with general economic reform, significant progress has been made but there 
are issues that remain. One of the largest issues is the Hukou system, which registers the 
population based on their family’s historic home. This has been especially damaging to 
rural workers, who come to cities in search of employment. These workers often have 
difficulties getting social services for themselves or their families and their migrant status 
makes them vulnerable to exploitation by employers and other.232 
                                                 
224 Cai, Park, and Zhao, “Chinese Labor Market,”172. 
225 Ibid., 173. 
226 Ibid. 
227 Ibid., 173–174. 
228 Cai, Park, and Zhao, “Chinese Labor Market,” 174. 
229 Ibid., 177. 
230 Ibid., 174. 
231 Ibid., 175. 
232 Ibid. 
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Labor reform, like more general economic reform, has greatly improved the lives 
and status of many Chinese people. These reforms have transformed the country from the 
Soviet-model command economy that was originally adopted under Mao to an economy 
that more closely resembles market-based capitalism. Critics can easily point to excessive 
government intervention, SOEs, or the Hukou system as relics of the old system that still 
remain, but the overall transformation is undeniable. With each year under reform, the 
PRC gets further from the time and systems of Mao and further into the age of a powerful 
and largely capitalist Chinese economy.  
B. CHINA IN RELATION TO THE COMPARISON CASE STUDIES 
While reform has fundamentally changed the nature of the Chinese economy, 
questions remain about how demographic trends will affect future prospects and whether 
the economy will be strong enough to withstand the demographic change it has begun 
experiencing. Many of the aspects of the economic reform and labor market reforms link 
directly to the qualities that have determined how well the comparison countries have 
performed in demographic decline. As will be illustrated below, while the command 
economy did well in maximizing its workforce, with almost universal labor participation, 
the labor was highly unproductive. Analytically, moreover, comparing an aspect like 
controlling pension benefits between a socialist economy and a capitalist economy is akin 
to comparing apples and oranges.  
This section will examine how China’s current economy is positioned to mitigate 
the potential economic damage from demographic decline. While the comparison 
countries are experiencing demographic decline, China’s is still about a decade away. 
China is already experiencing some of the precursor effects to decline including the 
shrinking of the labor force and a rising number of retirees. China still has time before the 
full onset of decline to potentially better prepare itself through sound policy. This 
snapshot will look at China today in the same categories—maximizing labor force, labor 
productivity, and controlling old-age benefits—used to examine the comparison countries 
and reveal where it is well-prepared for decline and where additional action is required.  
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1. Maximizing Labor Force 
When China was a command economy, labor force participation was virtually 
universal. While everyone had a job under socialism at times these jobs were simply 
make-work jobs, unproductive, and with poor pay.233 Gradually, as the Chinese economy 
has reformed and modernized, labor force participation declined. Labor force 
participation before SOE reform was 79% in 1990 then dropped to 76.8% in 2000 and 
down to 71% in 2010.234 This decline was intentionally slowed by the government due to 
concerns of the social unrest that could be caused by a large group of unemployed.235 
The aggressive reforms of the mid-1990s caused large increase in unemployed by forcing 
SOEs to restructure.236 This had led to a decrease in labor force participation. This is not 
completely a negative: some level of unemployment is generally considered positive in 
an economy as it represents workers transitioning to better and higher productivity jobs 
and is also a sign that employers have the ability to hire additional staff to support 
growing enterprises. Now that the number of workers in China is at its peak and 
demographic decline is a certain part of its future it may need to draw additional workers 
into the economy to support continued growth. As with the comparison countries, China 
could potentially maximize its labor in three ways: increased employment of females, 
extending the working life of older citizens, and immigration. 
a. Female Employment 
At 68 percent, the female employment rate in China is comparatively quite high at 
first glance (see Table 8). 
 
                                                 
233 Naughton, The Chinese Economy, 185. 
234 The World Bank, “Labor Force Participation Rate, Total (% of total population ages 15+)(National 
Estimate),” August 26, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.NE.ZS.  
235 Naughton, The Chinese Economy, 185. 
236 Ibid., 185–189. 
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Table 8.   Female Employment Opportunities.237 
Country % Employment Rate 
(15-64) Male 








Germany 77.6 68.0 9.6 5 
Japan 80.8 62.5 18.3 17 
Russia 73.6 64.7 8.9 57 
China 82.0 68.0 14.0 91 
                                                 
237 Male and Female Employment Rates from OECD Surveys: Germany (2012), Japan (2013), Russia (2012), China (2008); GII Rank from 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/table-4-gender-inequality-index; GII (Gender Inequality Index) is produced by the United Nations Development Programme. The 
index provides insight to the equality of opportunity for females in by examining health, economic, and social opportunities; Employment rate difference 
calculated by author. 
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Beyond this headline number though there are concerns for how well China is 
currently integrating females in meaningful employment and how it is likely to perform 
in the future. If the employment rate for females is divided between urban and rural 
females a different story emerges.238 During the last three censuses female employment 
in rural China has remained quite high (see Table 9), a fact that has maintained the high 
overall female employment figure. Much of this rural work is in labor-intensive 
agriculture and the whole family pitches in to work on family farms. As more technology 
permeates the Chinese agricultural sector the number of people employed in agriculture 
will decline. Future job growth is likely to concentrated in the urban areas. The effect of 
SOE restructuring and the increased social safety net can been seen as a decline in overall 
employment, but the decline has been steeper for urban women and the gap between 
urban men and women has grown larger.   
Table 9.   Census Employment Rates.239 
 1990 2000 2010 
Employment Rate for those aged 20–59 years (%) 
 China Urban Rural China Urban  Rural China Urban Rural 
Women 84.3 77.4 87.1 79.5 63.1 88.9 73.6 60.8 84.4 




11.4 14.5 10.3 12.5 19.2 7.9 15.1 20.3 9.9 
 
                                                 
238 Isabelle Attane, “Being a Woman in China Today: A Demography of Gender,” China Perspectives 
no. 2012/4 (Dec 2012): 5–15, http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/6013. 
239 After Employment rates from Attane, “Woman in China Today,” 8; Gender Gap from Author’s 
Calculations. 
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Where most modern economies have trended towards more female involvement it 
seems that in China the gender gap is growing. This helps explains why China performs 
relatively poorly on the Gender Inequality Index rank (see Table 8). The ideological 
commitment that the communist party showed to gender equality at the founding of the 
PRC seems to have faded along with other socialist instruments like the command 
economy. Replacing this commitment seems to be a resurgence of traditional Confucian 
values of a man’s superiority to women and a women’s place to be within the home.240 
This along the demographic gender imbalance seems to provide a consistent message that 
gender equality in the workforce is eroding in China. From the viewpoint of maximizing 
potential labor these societal values may prevent China from fully utilizing almost half of 
its potential labor. In this respect, China is comparable to Japan, also influenced by 
Confucian values, and it appears likely to continue to underutilize its female workforce as 
it experiences demographic decline.  
b. Elderly Employment 
With China unlikely to fully activate the potential of better female inclusion in the 
workforce, it will have to look to other potential sources to increase labor during its 
demographic decline. China’s elderly population, while currently large due to the size of 
the overall population, is only now truly beginning to grow (see Figure 14). This 
population is expected to double in the next two decades and nearly triple to over 360 
million by 2055.241 The growth of this population is a testament to the increased life 
expectancy of China. The potential downside, which will be examined later in this 
chapter, is that this elderly population may pose an economic burden on a shrinking 
number of workers. 
                                                 
240 Attane, “Woman in China Today,” 9. 
241 UNdata, “Population Aged 65 and over,” United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 




Figure 14.  China Population 65+ (in millions).242 
China appears well suited to employ this growing elderly population. Despite a 
low nominal retirement age, China’s effective retirement age is higher than both those of 
Germany and Russia (see Table 10). Already leading Russia in life expectancy, it is likely 
that this number will increase to closer to those of Germany and Japan as China continues 
to develop. Once again Japan provides the closest comparison to China, in that China is 
likely to have similar longevity and its elderly generally work well past the nominal 
retirement age. China’s nominal retirement age is low, but this has not prevented Chinese 
from working later in life. The low nominal retirement age may become a concern in 
regards to the resource drain it places on the government due to benefits, which will be 
addressed later in this chapter.   
                                                 
242 Data Source: UNdata, “Population aged 65 and over,” August 26, 2015, 
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=PopDiv&f=variableID%3A23. 
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M F M F M F 
Germany 22 25 65 65 62.1 61.6 
Japan 23 29 65 65 69.1 66.7 
Russia 14 20 60 55 63.3 60.0 
China 18 21 60 50/55 66.8 62.0 
 
c. Immigrant Employment 
China currently has a net outward immigration rate (see Table 11). This pattern of 
emigration has been present at various times during China’s history. Prior to the PRC, 
many Chinese left in search of opportunities to work in manual labor industries. As the 
PRC was coming to power many Chinese capitalists went with the Chinese Nationalists 
to Taiwan to escape the communist economic system. In recent times, much has been 
made of the brain drain, where Chinese students go abroad to study and at times stay 
abroad with their professional skills. The common factor in all of these periods is the 
pursuit of economic opportunity driving emigration. If China continues to prosper it may 
find fewer of its citizens leave in search of economic opportunity and it may attract 
                                                 
243 Life Expectancy at Age 60 from UNdata, “Life Expectancy at Age 60,” United Nations, August 
26, 2015, 
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=life+expectancy&d=WHO&f=MEASURE_CODE%3aWHOSIS_000015; 
Normal Retirement Age from OECD, Pensions at a Glance 2013: OECD and G20 Indicators (Paris: OECD 
Publishing, 2013) 232, 256, 289, 325, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/pension_glance-2013-en; Nominal female 
retirement in China, 50 for laborers, 55 for professionals; Effective Retirement Age from OECD, 
“Expected Years in Retirement,” in Society at a Glance 2014: OECD Social Indicators (Paris: OECD 
Publishing, 2014), 105, DOI : http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/soc_glance-2014-15-en. 
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immigrants from less prosperous economies. If this occurs China has the potential to 
reverse its outward immigration rate.  
Table 11.   Net Migration, Crude Birth, and Death Rates.244 











Germany 1.3 8.5 10.9 -2.4 
Japan 0.6 8.4 9.8 -1.4 
Russia 1.5 11.8 15.5 -3.7 
China -0.2 13.4 7.2 6.2 
 
Economic opportunity alone is not the only factor that impacts a potential 
immigrant’s decision. Immigration is also affected by legal restraints, proximity and ease 
of entry to home country, existing immigrant communities, and intangible factors like 
cultural acclimatization. It remains to be seen if improving economic opportunities in 
China are able to reverse the flow of emigrants and better attract immigrants. For now 
China’s economy is losing potential workers, leaving it far behind the comparison 
countries in terms of immigration.  
As China’s workforce begins its decline and the economy drives up the cost of 
labor it may draw in outside workers. Currently, though China is losing ground both in 
underutilization of female workers and due to the immigration of potential workers. 
China is utilizing its older workers effectively and this is likely to increase as continued 
modernization is expected to increase longevity. If China is unable to maximize its work 
                                                 
244 Net Migration Rate, Crude Death Rate, and Crude Birth Rate for period (2010-2015) from United 
Nations, World Population Prospects,188, 320, 409, 634; Difference between CBR and CDR, authors 
calculation.  
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force, then continued economic growth will be even more dependent on increasing the 
productivity of its workers. 
2. Labor Productivity 
China’s labor productivity in terms of GDP per person employed is expectedly 
lower than the more developed comparison countries (see Table 12). Chinese laborers 
still undertake relatively low-technology forms of work in both the rural and sectors 
while, by contrast, German and Japanese workers are more highly productive due to their 
access to capital investments and technology. Yet productivity does not only rely on the 
capital a worker has to work with; it can also be impacted by business practices, or even 
matching the right worker to the right task.  
Generally, when enterprises are forced to compete in a fair market, competition 
drives businesses to be more productive. A business that produces more with the same 
inputs should have an inherent advantage that can lead to either lower prices or higher 
profit margins for the business. Without competition, this strong incentive to try to do 
more with less is lessened. In China, productivity at the competition shielded SOEs has 
grown slower. From 1978–1988, growth output per worker in non-SOEs (3.89 per year) 
outpaced that of SOEs (3.30 per year).245 From 1988 to 2004, competition increased due 
to globalization and significant SOE reform was enacted leading to even more increase in 
of output per worker, in both SOEs (5.86 per year) and non-SOEs (6.67 per year).246 
When competition was introduced incentive was provided for productivity improvement.  
When China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 domestic 
Chinese companies were further exposed to competition.247 WTO accession reduced 
China’s ability to adopt protectionist measures to shield its companies from international 
competition.248 Naughton’s analysis of the effect of this in terms of productivity is that:  
                                                 
245 Loren Brandt, Chang-tai Hsieh, and Xiaodong Zhu, “Growth and Structural Transformation in 
China,” in China’s Great Economic Transformation, ed. Loren Brandt and Thomas G. Rawski (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 696. 
246 Ibid. 
247 Naughton, The Chinese Economy, 110. 
248 Ibid. 
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This will inevitably accelerate the pace at which the market discriminates 
between successful and unsuccessful market competitors. While this 
process is driving the creation of a more productive and competitive 
economy, it also increases the urgency for China to provide effective 
policies to ease the transition of millions out of obsolete, low-productivity 
jobs, and speed their finding of productive roles in the emerging 
economy.249 
Naughton’s analysis appears correct due to the acceleration in growth in GDP per 
person employed occurring around this time period (see Figure 15). 
 
Figure 15.  GDP per Person Employed, China.250 
 
Things that can deter competition are high entry barriers for new businesses and 
when the government forbids competition or subsidies a particular enterprise at the 
expense of others. The Doing Business Score (see Table 12) shows that competition in 
China is stifled compared to that of the comparison countries.  
                                                 
249 Naughton, The Chinese Economy, 110. 
250 Data Source: World Bank, “GDP per Person Employed (constant 1990$ PPP),” 25 Aug, 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.GDP.PCAP.EM.KD. 
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China’s labor freedom score, which examines labor regulations, is above that of 
Germany and Russia, but below Japan’s (see Table 12). The Hukou system still hurts the 
free movement of labor in China, since it provides significant disincentives for 
underutilized workers in rural areas to move to urban areas where potential jobs may be 
found.   










Overall, China is closest to Russia in terms of its productivity. This may be a 
carry-over effect from the Soviet style command economy that both of these economies 
grew out of. Another potential parallel is that the lack of real political competition in both 
countries has had an effect on business competition. Political connections would seem 
more important in countries with underdeveloped legal institutions and where one party 
rule exists. The economic importance of political competition though is not completely 
clear as Japan provides an example of a country whose growth occurred during a period 
of extended one-party dominance. Economically, at least, encouraging competition seems 
to be linked to increased productivity that China has experienced since 1988.   
                                                 
251 GPD per Person from The World Bank, August 16, 2015, http://datacatalog.worldbank.org; Labor 
Freedom Score from “2015 Index of Economic Freedom,” The Heritage Foundation, 
http://www.heritage.org/index/explore; Doing Business Score 2015 from “Doing Business Report Series,” 
World Bank Group, http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports. 





Germany 43,243 51.2 79.73 
Japan 44,851 90.2 74.8 
Russia 19,656 58.9 66.66 
China 15,250 63.0 62.58 
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3. Controlling Old-Age Benefits 
An additional concern of demographic change is the budgetary impact of 
medicine, pension and other old age benefits. In China, these programs have undergone 
significant change. In the socialist era, reform pensions and other benefits were generally 
the responsibility of the individual work unit, often an SOE. As part of China’s 
marketization reforms, a pension system has been developed that can follow the 
individual from job to job. This pension only covers urban workers, which comprise 
about half the workforce.252 Rural elderly Chinese, by contrast, mostly depend on family 
for support.253 For rural elderly that are without dependents, unable to work, and without 
money there is a social relief program that provides a minimal benefit.254  China’s 
current pension systems are underfunded according to a Chinese Academy of Social 
Studies report that states “without adjustments, pension deficits would appear in 2030, 
and that by 2050 the accumulated shortfall would amount to 90% of China’s GDP.”255 
While the current system is underfunded, the lack of a universal pension system keeps 
spending on public pensions well below the comparison cases (see Table 13). A World 
Bank study estimates that a minimal pension with universal coverage would currently 
cost China about 0.24% of GDP growing to about 0.43% of GDP by 2040.256 The benefit 
from this proposed coverage would be enough to bring elderly to the poverty level.257 A 
more generous benefit, similar to the OECD average, would provide urban elderly 28% 
average wage replacement and would costs 0.75% GDP now and 2.1% GDP in 2040.258 
Comparatively, the cost for a universal elderly poverty protection in China is low but is 
set to rise due to demographics. 
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255 “Paying for the Grey,” The Economist, posted April 5, 2014, 
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China’s old-age dependency ratio is set to rise quickly over the next several 
decades. Old-age dependency ratio is the ratio of elderly people to those working-age. 
Since working-age people are generally the ones contributing taxes to the government 
and elderly receiving benefits, the ratio provides insight to this balance. As the ratio 
increases, effectively each working-age individual will have to contribute to supporting 
more elderly people.  
At the family level, the prevalence of one-child families means that individuals 
will be responsible alone for supporting elderly family members during their retirement. 
This is the “4-2-1 problem,” where successive generations of single child families, means 
that the youngest generation may need to help support two parents and four grandparents 
as they age. This heavy support burden is likely to prompt calls for the government to 
shoulder a larger financial share of elderly costs. If the government does increase its 
commitment to the elderly, the very low nominal retirement ages will increase the 
expense of pension benefits.  
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Table 13.   Dependency Ratios and Spending on Public Pensions.259 


















M F M F 
Germany 32.7 59.9 11.3 19.9 23.8 65 65 
Japan 43.6 71.8 10.2 16.0 22.7 65 65 
Russia 18.8 32.8 9.2 12.4 20.0 60 55 
China 13.1 39.0 3.0 13.4 18.8 60 50/55 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
Concerns about future demographic challenges in China’s economy are valid, but 
it is also important to maintain perspective of how much China has economically 
progressed. China has progress from a Soviet-style command economy towards a market-
oriented economic model. This transformation working in tandem with a large 
demographic dividend has driven China economy to second largest in the world. As 
China faces demographic decline, its economy will be tested. Will the still imperfect 
labor market be prepared to handle demographic change? Will global competition 
continue to push China’s companies to operate more efficiently? Will China be able to 
control the costs of a growing elderly population?      
                                                 
259 2015 and 2050 Old-age Dependency Ratios from United Nations, World Population Prospects, 
320, 409, 634; % GDP Spent on Public Pensions and Nominal Retirement Age from OECD, Pensions at a 
Glance 2013, 232, 256, 289, 325; Expected Years in Retirement from OECD, “Expected Years in 
Retirement,” 105; Nominal female retirement in China, 50 for laborers, 55 for professionals.  
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In comparison to countries currently experiencing demographic decline, China 
falls behind in several key aspects. In respect to maximizing labor, China appears to be 
regressing in the utilization of female labor. China also is struggling to keep or attract 
potential workers through immigration. Only in extending the working life of workers as 
they age does China compare favorably to the comparison countries. China also has 
significant progress still to make in order to maximize the productivity of its workers. 
Some of this will naturally increase as each worker has access to more capital and as 
newer cohorts of workers tend to be better educated than retiring workers. Yet, holdover 
effects from the command economy and the high levels of political influence in the 
economy threaten to keep China’s workers less productive than those of Japan or 
Germany. Finally, China has been able to keep its pension costs very low, by far the 
lowest of the comparable countries, albeit as a result of the low coverage of retired 
workers. This can been used to invest and continue to grow the economy in the short 
term. In the long term, as China ages these costs will grow.  
Overall, when considering these metrics, China’s economy is poorly positioned 
for the coming demographic decline. While China still has a decade before it enters into 
the fifth stage of its demographic transition, without significant changes, China’s 
economy will enter this transition without some of the mitigating factors that have helped 
the comparison economies through the transition.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis challenges the notion that demographics are economically 
deterministic. It examines countries in similar demographic situations to reveal that these 
have widely varying economic impacts. It then examines several potential mitigation 
measures that might explain these varying outcomes. The first mitigation measure it 
examines is labor force maximization, consisting of the employment of females, the 
elderly, and migrant. Then it examines labor productivity as a potential way to mitigate 
the effects of a decreasing workforce. And finally, it examines controlling the 
government’s cost of elderly care. Using Germany, Japan, and Russia as a baseline, the 
thesis examines China’s readiness to mitigate its demographic transition and finds China 
presently poorly suited for its impending demographic change. 
This analysis would be incomplete without acknowledging a common flaw in 
scholarly work on demographics and economics. Often, present trends are extrapolated 
without the consideration of how the environment around these trends may change. In 
demographics, this was famously the case of the early Malthusian thinkers. These 
thinkers identified the near exponential growth of the human population, and rightfully 
judged that the current economy and agriculture could not support such a burgeoning 
population. The logical flaw, however, is that while the current economy and agriculture 
could not support the future population, the growing population and demand for more 
food led to innovations that dramatically increased future outputs. The foil of the 
Malthusian viewpoint is the “cornucopian” viewpoint, the assumption that future 
innovation will always provide enough. My viewpoint, is that, while it is difficult to 
predict the future, the essential point from a policy point of view is that the future is not 
already determined but instead can be shaped.  
This thesis examines China’s demographic decline and the economic hardships 
that some are predicting as a result. While China’s demographic trajectory, as reviewed 
in Chapter Two, is unlikely to significantly change, my argument is that demographic 
decline does not necessarily precipitate economic hardships. To examine this argument 
the cases of Germany, Japan, and Russia were reviewed. These countries are all 
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experiencing demographic decline, but with greatly differing economic levels of 
hardship. The widely varying experiences of these three countries provides evidence that 
demographic decline does not affect all countries in the same manner. The extension of 
this line of reasoning then is to examine countries to better understand what is different in 
these cases that impacts the effects of demographic decline. Chapter Three reviewed 
these economies and examined the potential mitigation pathways employed to dampen 
the effects of demographic decline. 
Chapter Four then applied these same criteria to China. The finding that 
concludes Chapter Four is that “China’s economy is poorly positioned for the coming 
demographic decline. While China still has a decade before it enters into the fifth stage of 
its demographic transition, without significant changes, China’s economy will enter this 
transition without some of the mitigating factors that have helped the comparison 
economies through the transition.”260 This is based on China’s current demographic-
economic situation and as stated before it would be a mistake to extrapolate the trend 
without consideration for how it may change the environment it is in. While China is 
currently not well suited is there a high probability that this could change?  
A. CHINA’S TRAJECTORY 
Some of China’s potential mitigation effects may change as the demographic 
environment changes. This section examines the potential trajectories of the mitigation 
measures, and reviews some potential policy issues that could impact these trajectories.    
1. Maximizing Labor Force 
The first pathway of mitigation that this thesis examines is the maximization of 
available labor. China is already maximizing its potential elderly workforce at high levels 
and this is only expected to improve as rising GDP per capita generally contributes to 
improvements in longevity and health. China is losing potential workers both by 
underutilizing females and by its negative net migration rates. These trends may not be 
set. A potential dynamic in China’s economy is that as labor becomes more scare due to 
                                                 
260 Quote from the Conclusion of Chapter 4. 
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demographic decline, the cost of labor will rise. Increasing wages could pull more 
females or attract more immigrants into China’s labor market.  
This free market type dynamic occurs when there are not significant barriers in 
the market. Unfortunately, for China’s economic future there seems to be a growing 
barrier specifically for further inclusion of women in the market. The Gender Inequality 
Index indicates that China’s women have significantly less equality than those of the 
comparison countries. Chinese women’s economic opportunities have been deteriorating 
over the past two decades in relative to those of Chinese men.261 This corroborates the 
predictions of worsening relative status of women in gender imbalanced societies made 
by Hudson and den Boer in Bare Branches.262 China seems to be headed in the wrong 
direction on female inclusion in the workforce.  
Immigration is potentially a different story. The PRC has always had net outward 
immigration, generally rising from 1950–1955 and reaching a peak in 2000–2005.263 
Since this period net outward migration has begun to decline (see Figure 16).264  
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Figure 16.  Net Migration China (outward, in thousands).265 
As economic opportunity is often a primary driver of migration, it seems likely 
that as China’s economy grows it will attract more immigrants and have fewer leave in 
search of economic opportunities elsewhere. A second aspect that may slow the outward 
migration is demographic change itself. Those who emigrate  tend to be young adults.266  
As China’s population ages, this demographic of those most likely to leave will shrink, 
likely reducing its outward immigration total.  
As far as those immigrating to China the numbers is still small compared to those 
leaving and especially in relation to the overall size of the Chinese population. Several 
immigrant communities have developed in China, including those which would be 
expected due to proximity, like Beijing’s “Korea Town” of Wangjing, or Shanghai’s 
Japanese enclave but also others are from further abroad, like Yiwu’s Middle Eastern 
community and Guangzhou’s African community.267 These communities may provide an 
                                                 
265 Data Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects, 188. 
266 Pugel, International Economics, 369. 
267 Shen Haimei, “Inflow of International Immigrants Challenges China’s Migration Policy,” 
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important foothold in China, lowering the impact of cultural displacement and developing 
networks for future immigrants. 
The gender imbalance has also played a role in immigration as, “a shortage of 
females in China has also created a demand for foreign brides.”268 These brides at times 
are purchased from poorer surrounding countries or are illegal immigrants forced to 
marry Chinese men.269 This is another aspect of gender-imbalanced societies examined 
by Hudson and den Boer, though they raise concerns that many of these “brides” are 
actually forced into prostitution.270  
Overall, China appears likely to continue its high levels of employment of elderly 
workers, potentially increase the level of immigrant employment (or at least slow the net 
migration decline), and decrease the level of female employment. Due to relative size, the 
loss in potential female labor force vastly outweighs the potential gain in immigrant 
labor. A 5% drop in the female labor force participation rate from 2010 to 2020 would 
result in losing approximately 46 workers per 1000 population over ten years (see Table 
14).271 To offset this, the net migration would have increase from -0.2 annually to 4.6, 
assuming that every incoming migrant will participate in the labor force. This equates to 
a net inward immigration of over 6 million immigrants a year and is higher than the U.S. 
immigration rate of 3.1 per year.272 
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Table 14.   Results of a Drop in Female Labor Force Participation Rate.273 
 Females (20–59) 
% of Total Population 30.65 
2010 LFPR 63.7 
Workers in 1000 (2010) 226 
Workers in 1000 with 5% decrease in LFPR (hypothetical 2020) 
 180 
Labor Force Difference per 1000 population 46 
 
Not only does China seem unlikely to mitigate demographic decline by 
maximizing its labor force, it appears likely that decreasing labor force participation by 
women will make the effect of demographic decline on the workforce more acute.    
Several policy changes could potentially allow China to better maximize its labor. 
Completely doing away with the One-Child policy may have several benefits. First, it 
may lead to a small increase in fertility. Any increase is likely to remain small due to the 
ingrained social norms of small families that have developed over several decades of the 
policy. While an increase in fertility would eventually provide more labor and help ease 
the extent of China’s demographic decline, the effect on the labor market would occur at 
least two decades from now. Second, several scholars have noted that the One-Child 
policy contributes to the gender imbalance.274 Abolishing the policy may help restore the 
natural gender balance yet, once again, this would be a slowly developing effect and is 
not a foregone conclusion; for example, South Korea and India also have gender 
imbalances without a One-Child policy. Restoring the gender balance could improve the 
status of women in China, leading to higher labor force participation rates.   
                                                 
273 Female % of Total Population from China Statistical Yearbook, “ Population by Age and Sex,” 
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A second potential policy improvement would be reform of the immigration 
system. China is unaccustomed to being the receiver of immigrants and its relevant 
policies are focused on visitors, not those intending to stay and work for the long-term.275 
The current system favors those “who are highly educated and can work in high-tech or 
bring large investments with them.”276 As China’s demographics change, the demand for 
workers of all skill levels may drive this policy to be more inclusionary. Access to legal 
methods of immigration could improve the lives of the “foreign brides” bringing them 
out from an undocumented status, reducing the abuse and smuggling of women.277 
2. Labor Productivity 
A second pathway of mitigation is by using the labor available more productively. 
China’s productivity is currently lower than the comparison countries, but this is 
expected in a developing country that does not have nearly the same capital stock per 
worker compared to Japan or Germany. Productivity growth, in terms of output per 
worker, though has been improving rapidly: according to one study it has, “tripled in 
China between 1980 and 2004, and this pace has been maintained to the present.”278 Part 
of this growth reflects high rates of investment leading to increasing capital stock for 
workers to use.279  
China’s economy has maintained very high rates of investment, but not all 
investment has the same amount of beneficial economic effect. Beyond firms funding 
their own investment, China’s domestic banks provide the primary vehicle for financing 
need for investments.280 This banking sector is dominated by the four state-owned 
banks.281 These banks have tended to give the majority of their loans to SOEs and to 
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fund government sponsored development projects.282 A significant portion of these loans 
became non-performing (up to 29% in 2001 though down significantly to about 1% in 
2014) indicating that some lending decisions had been made due to political 
considerations or other non-economic justifications.283 If China’s financing markets have 
truly been reformed, then future investments should help improve labor productivity, but 
if politics and not economics drives lending decisions much of this investment may be 
wasted. 
Ensuring future investment is economically productive is one way that China can 
improve its labor productivity. This requires firm barriers between politics and 
economics. In China, many see the SOEs as bastions of low-productivity growth enabled 
by political relationships. Perkins and Rawski predict, “China’s productivity prospects 
will benefit from further reforms aimed at getting the state out of direct ownership and 
management of industrial and service sector enterprises.”284 Whether these types of 
reforms will come to fruition remain to be seen. 
A second aspect of using labor well is a functioning labor market, allowing labor 
to move freely to from low-productivity jobs to higher productivity. This has also seen 
significant improvement in China during reform, though barriers in the labor market still 
remain. The Hukou system presents barriers for rural Chinese to move to and find work 
in cities. As urban economies grow, the Hukou system can be a constraint on growth as it 
deters potential rural workers from joining the urban economy.285 The justifications for 
the system include preventing urban overcrowding and providing employment protection 
for urban residents.286 Reforms have reduced the importance of the Hukou and other 
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barriers to rural to urban migration, but they have progressed slowly, are incomplete.287 
China still has a significant misappropriation of labor due to these barriers in the labor 
market.288  
3. Controlling Old-Age Benefits 
The cost of old-age benefits is going to rise in China due to the increasing number 
of elderly people. This is almost unavoidable consequence of demographic aging. It also 
appears that these costs will be no worse than those within the comparison countries. The 
expectation of significant government support of the elderly has not developed for 
Chinese that work outside the state sector. These lower expectations should help China 
control the expense of these benefits. 
Minimum universal pension coverage would help alleviate the potential problem 
of elderly poverty. This would certainly increase the governments cost, but as the World 
Bank study estimated only by perhaps 2.1% of GDP.289 Even with this additional cost 
China would still be well below the pension costs of the comparison countries relative to 
GDP. A second potential reform will be to raise the nominal retirement age. This would 
help ensure that elderly costs remain low as life expectancies grow. Retirement ages are 
set to increase to 67 in most OECD countries by 2050 and China might use this number 
as a guide.290 A final potential reform would be to change from a pay as you go scheme, 
where current workers pay for current retirees to one where workers contributions are 
invested towards their future benefits. This is similar to the retirement changes 
Americans are familiar with where defined benefit plans have been generally phased out 
in favor of defined contribution plans. The effect of this change is to shift longevity risk, 
that life-expectancies will grow, from corporations to individual retirees. A transition like 
this is complicated because legacy costs from the previous plan must be paid as well as 
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contributions to future beneficiaries.291 While the transition is difficult, in the long run it 
may ensure a more sustainable retirement system. 
B. AREAS FOR ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION 
The story of China’s demographic transition is just beginning to be told. This 
thesis attempts to contribute some to the understanding of how this transition may impact 
China’s economic future, but the author does not suppose that this is the definitive work 
on the matter. This research in many ways exposed the author to more questions than it 
has answered. 
An especially compelling topic includes further historical and quantitative work 
on the economic effects of gender-imbalance. Bare Branches covers much of the societal 
implications of this phenomenon, but the economic implications are less developed.292 
This is becoming increasingly pertinent as India, South Korea, and China, continue to 
grow in economic significance and are all experiencing imbalances.293  
Additional research would be beneficial in determining the accuracy of predictor 
statistics just prior to demographic decline for those later on during the decline. Does 
demographic decline lead to changes in immigration flow or are immigration flows more 
sensitive to national attitudes and historical precedent? Another potential incident where 
population dynamics might drive policy is labor mobility. Will China loosen its barriers 
to internal migration as its urban industries begin to experience more labor shortages or 
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C. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Demographic change will continue to shape the world we live in. Its effects will 
be far reaching, impacting various aspects of life. This change is often presented in 
alarmist terms, but the effects of demographic change need not always be negative. Some 
countries undergoing demographic change are likely to adapt well, others not. 
Demographic decline will reduce the working age population. Some countries will be 
able to mitigate some of this effect by pulling workers in from the margins, who either by 
personal or societal choices have not previously been working. Bringing in workers from 
the margins will be unlikely to completely account for the loss of labor due to 
demographic change. Labor will become scarcer but it is a resource and, as with other 
resources, well-functioning markets will allocate this resource efficiently. If labor is 
efficiently allocated to its most productive uses, total production may increase even as 
labor as a factor decreases. Examples abound where labor became more expensive and 
technology or capital filled the gap: robots replacing auto assembly line workers, ATMs 
replacing tellers, computers replacing telephone switchboard operators.294 There is no 
reason to believe that this will not also occur as demographic decline occurs. Finally, 
countries experiencing demographic decline will have to adapt to an older population. 
This will include ensuring that there is control over the benefits for the elderly 
population. People living longer and healthier is not a bad thing, but the generous benefits 
designed for workers expected to only spend a few short years in retirement are 
unaffordable when that time period grows to several decades.  
These are the challenges that most of the developed world faces, and these are the 
challenges that China faces. In many ways, China does not appear ready for its 
demographic decline, but this does not mean it is destined for economic hardship. There 
is still some time for China to mitigate the economic effects of its decline. After all, 
demographics are not deterministic, but instead demographics are what you make of 
them.       
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